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RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
CARTON & C0. v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD C0.
An act of the state legislature, whose object and purpose is to control and regulate
the shipment of freight to points in other states, is in violation of article 1, sect. 8,
of the Constitution of the United States, as being legislation on interstate commerce,
a subject which is in its nature national, and requiring the exclusive legislation of
Congress.
An interstate contract of shipment, entered into by a common carrier, is an
entire contract, and the laws of the state wherein it is made, so far as they attempt
to regulate interstate commerce, do not enter into it as a part of the contract, being
repugnant to the Federal Constitution [BECK, J., dissenting].
A contract is subject to the laws of the state wherein it is made and which are
applicable thereto.
A state may regulate charges on shipments of goods, by statutes not in conflict
with the Constitution of the United States as regulations of commezce, and in the
absence of any legislation by Congress upon the subject, such laws cannot be regarded
as an encroachment on the anthority of the general government.
Such regulations of commerce only as impose burdens and restrictions are for-
bidden to the state by the Constitution of the United States, but laws which aid in
securing expeditious and cheap transportation, and which remove burdens, impedi-
ments and restrictions imposed on commerce by common carriers through unneces-
sary delays, and by their unreasonable and unjust exactions and discriminating
charges, are not regulations of commerce within the contemplation of the Constitution
of the United States.
APPEAL from Hardin Circuit Court.
This is an action to recover certain alleged excessive freight
charges paid by the plaintiff to the defenidant for transporting
grain from Ackley, Iowa, to Chicago, Illinois. The cause was
tried in the court below without a jury, and upon an agreement as
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to the facts, judgment was rendered for the defendant for cost3.
Plaintiffs appealed.
Brown &- Corney, for appellants.
John 1?. Duncombe, for appellee.
IOTHROCK, J.-It appears from the agreed statement of facts
that between the eleventh day of April A. D. 1875, and the four-
teenth day of April 1876, the plaintiffs delivered to the defendant
at Ackley, Iowa, to be shipped to Chicago, Illinois, through
defendant, 129 car loads of wheat, and the defendant fixed the-
price and charged for the freight thereon from Ackley to Chicago,
37 cents per 100 pounds, or $74 per car load of 20,000 pounds; and
between April 14th 1876, and March 11th, 1878, 120 cars more,
for which the defendant received and charged for shipment the
same rate. The grain was loaded at Ackley in cars furnished by the
defendant and carried through in bulk to Chicago in a continuous
shipment. All of the cars were billed through from Ackley, Iowa,
to Chicago, Illinois, and the defendant fixed the rate of freight
thus charged, and gave plaintiffs through shipping receipts to
Chicago. It is claimed that the freight thus charged, and paid by
the plaintiffs, was in excess of that authorized by the laws of Iowa
at that time in force; that the distance from Ackley by defendant's
road to Dubuque, on the Iowa state line, is 132 miles, and the
distance from Dubuque to Chicago by defendant's line is 202 miles,
making a total distance through both states of 334 miles, and that
the rate of freight fixed by the law of Illinois was at that time less
than the rate fixed by the statute of Iowa. Damages are claimed
for the difference between what was authorized by the law of Iowa
to be charged for the transportation for the whole distance; also, for
attorney's fees for prosecuting the action.
It is claimed by counsel for the defendant that the law of Iowa
then in force [being chapter 68 of the Acts of the Fifteenth Gen-
eral Assembly], by its plain language and meaning, had no applica-
tion to contracts made for the transportation of freight into other
states. Section 3 of that act, so far as applicable to this case, is as
follows: "The tariff of rates established in the following schedule
shall be considered the basis on which to compute the compensation
for transporting freight, goods, merchandise or property over any
kind of railroad within this state. * * *" Some of us think this
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language excludes contracts for the transportation of freights to
points without the state. But as the plaintiffs claimed that these
were contracts made in Iowa for through shipments to Chicago,
and that by taking the law of Illinois to the law of Iowa, thus mak-
ing it one continuous haul, the rate for the continuous haul, being
in excess of that authorized by the law of Iowa, may be recovered
back. We think it is not necessary to put a construction upon the
law of this state in this regard, but rest our decision upon another
ground.
It is claimed by the defendant that whatever construction may
be put on the law of this state, it can have no application to ship-
ments of freight from this state to other states, because state legis-
lation of that character is void, as being contrary to article 1, sect.
8, of the Constitution of the United States, which confers upon
Congress the power "1 to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states." Now, if this position be correct, it is
needless to enter into a discussion of all the questions so elaborately
and ably discussed by counsel in this case. If the law of Iowa,
conceding that it contemplates the control or regulation of ship-
ments of freights to other states, is in that particular void as being
an infraction of the Federal Constitution, it cannot be enforced, and
the defendant was not bound to obey it, and could fix its own
freight tariff, and the plaintiffs cannot recover for a violation of the
statute, whatever other rights they may have.
It is not claimed that the fixing of rates of freight shipped from
one state into another is not a regulation of commerce. "Any
regulation of the transportation of freight upon the high seas, the
lakes, the rivers, or upon the railroads or other artificial channels
of communication, is a regulation of commerce itself:" City of
Council Bluffs v. K. C., St. J. C. B. Railroad Co., 45 Iowa
338. This has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court of the
United States: Reading Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall.
232; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; State of Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling Bridge Co., 18 Id. 421; Gibbons v. Oyden, 9
Wheat. 1.
There is a line of cases determined in the Supreme Court of the
United States which hold that it is competent for the states, in the
absence of legislation by Congress, to legislate respecting interstate
commerce, but those cases have been such as relate to bridges or
dams across streams wholly within a state, police laws relating to
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pilots of vessels, health laws, and the like. See Cooley v. Board
of Wardens, 12 How. 299; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall.
713. But that court has always held that the power to enact laws
upon subjects in their nature national, and not merely local, is
exclusively with Congress. In (Jooley v. Board of Wardens, supra,
it is said: "Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature
national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation,
may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive
legislation by Congress.
.That the act of this state, assuming that its object and purpose
was to control and regulate the shipments of freight to other states,
is of the character last defined, appears to be very clear, and we
are not without authority upon this question: and from a source
which so far as questions involving the construction of the Federal
Constitution are involved, are binding tupon this court and all other
courts in the Union.
The legislature of the state of Pennsylvania enacted a law
imposing a tax upon freight taken up within the state and carried
out of it, or taken up without the state and carried within it. The
Pennsylvania Railroad Company refused to pay the tax, upon the
ground that the law was unconstitutional and void, being in conflict
with the Constitution of the United States which ordains that
"Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states." In qZhe State Jireight
Tax, 15 Wall. 232, involving the validity of this act, it was
held that the tax imposed thereby was upon the freight carried,
and that. it was a regulation of interstate transportation or com-
merce among the states. The court in that case say: "If,
then, this is a tax upon freight carried between states, and a tax
'because of its transportation, and if such tax is in effect a reg-
ulation of interstate commerce, the conclusion seems to be inev-
itable that it is in conflict with the Constitution of the United
States." It is there further said: " The rule has been asserted
with great clearness, that whenever the subjects over which a power
to regulate commerce is asserted are in their nature national, or
admit of -one uniform system or plan of regulation, they may
justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legis-
lation by Congress. Truly, transportation of passengers, or mer-
chandise through a state, or from one state to another, is of this
nature."
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In tHenderson v. MTayor of New York, 92 U. S. 272, the follow-
ing language is used: "It is said, however, that under the decisions
of this court there is a kind of neutral ground, especially in that
covered by the regulation of commerce, which may be occupied by
the state, and its legislation be valid, so long as it interferes with no
act of Congress or treaty of the United States. Such a proposition
is supported by the opinions of several of the judges in The Pas-
senger Cases; by the decisions of this court in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 12 How. 299, and by the cases of Crandall v. -Nevada,
6 Wall. 35, and Wilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Id. 713. But this
doctrine has been always controverted in this court, and has seldom
if ever been stated without dissent. These decisions, however, all
agree that under the commercial clause of the Constitution, or
within its compass, there are powers which, from their nature, are
exclusive in Congress, and in the case of Cooley v. Board of War-
dens, it is said that "whatever subjects of this power are in their
nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regula-
tion, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress."
In the case of Railroad Co. v. i1faryland, 21 Wall. 456, it was
determined that the charter of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company for constructing and operating a branch railroad from
Baltimore to Washington, upon a stipulation contained in the
charter that the company should pay the state of Maryland one-
fifth of the amount of money received for the transportation of
passengers, was not an infraction of the Federal Constitution as being
a regulation of interstate commerce. It is there said: "The
exercise of power on the part of the state is very different from
the imposition of a tax or duty upon the movements or operations
of commerce between the states. Such an imposition, whether
relating to persons or goods, we have decided the states cannot
make, because it would be a regulation of commerce between the
states in a matter in which uniformity is essential to the rights of
all, and therefore requiring the exclusive legislation of Congress."
In that case the state of Maryland in grantifig the charter, expressly
reserved the right to part of the earnings of the road, and the
power to do so was upheld upon the principle that if the state had
itself built the road and operated it, it would have been entitled to
its earnings.
The cases of ]JTunn v. Dlinois, 94 U. S. 113; C., B. f Q. Railroad
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Co. v. Iowa, Id. 155, and .Peik v. C. & N. W. Railroad Co., Id.
164, do not appear to us to sanction the validity of acts of the
state legislature regulating the transportation of freight and pas-
sengers between the states. They merely determine the power
of the state to fix reasonable warehouse charges, and reasonable
charges for transportation of freight within the boundaries of the
states respectively, and that where such power is exercised, although
it may incidentally affect commerce between the states, yet the
laws of the states are not regulations of interstate commerce
because of such incidental results. That it was not intended in
those cases to approve legislation like that under consideration in
this case, it appears to us is conclusively shown by the reasoning
in the later cases of Hall v. IDeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, and Raiboad
Co. v. Husen, Id. 465.
It is urged with great earnestness that these contracts of ship-
ment are entire contracts, and having been entered into in Iowa,
the laws of this state entered into and become a part of the con-
tracts, and the statute fixing the rate governed the price for the
entire distance. This rule is, no doubt, correct when applied to a
valid enactment of the legislature of the state where a contract is
entered into, and no one doubts the power of a common carrier to
bind itself to ship freight beyond state lines, or even to foreign
countries and beyond the terminus of its line of transportation.
Under such a contract it is everywhere held that the carrier is
bound to perform his contract and is liable for loss by negligence.
But this position of counsel, it seems to us, begs the question, be-
cause if the law of Iowa, under consideration, is an unauthorized
regulation of interstate commerce, it cannot enter into and become
part of any contract. This position of counsel forcibly illustrates
the correctness of our conclusions, that the law in question, if held
to have been intended to operate upon interstate traffic, is directly
and palpably contrary to the Constitution of the United States. If
the law entered into and become part of the contract of shipment we
would have a law of Iowa which would control and regulate the
transportation of freight not only to the remotest parts of the states
and territories of this country, but extending to all nations of the
earth to which lines of common carriers extend, and to which local
carriers may undertake to transport goods. That such legislation
is national in its character, it seems to us, must be conceded.
If we are correct in these views there is but little more necessary
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to be said in this case. The plaintiffs claim to recover because the
amount of freight money exacted by the defendant was in excess
of the rate fixed by the law of Iowa. The contract of shipment
was an entirety. It cannot be severed and made to apply partly
to the shipment in Iowa and partly to that in Illinois. It was the
right of the defendant to disregard any laws which sought to reg-
ulate shipments to points without the state, and make its own con-
tracts. Having done so, the plaintiffs cannot recover under any
state law, simply because it is void, as being repugnant to the Fed-
eral Constitution. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any relief,
independent of the statute, we do not determine, because that
question is not in this case. Affirmed.
BECK, J., dissenting.-I am unable to concur in the arguments
and conclusions announced in the preceding opinion of the court
prepared by Mr. Justice ROTHROCK. The case is one of gteat
importance, as the decision affects the interest of all the people of
the state. This consideration has stimulated me in its careful
examination with the purpose of preparing an extended discussion
of the doctrines which, in my opinion, should control the decision
of the important questions involved in the case. But I am unable,
within the limited time which other judicial duties permit me to
devote to the case, to carry out my purpose, and I am compelled to
limit myself to a brief statement of the principles upon which I
base my dissent to the opinion of the majority of the court.
It is shown by the record before us that the defendant re-
ceived the grain shipped by plaintiffs for transportation to the city
of Chicago. A contract was thus entered into by the defendant
for the.carriage of the grain from Ackley to Chicago. This con-
tract was made in Ackley, and is therefore subject to the laws of
the state applicable thereto.
It is competent for the state to enact the statute in question
unless it should be found to be in conflict with the Constitution of
the United States as a regulation of commerce. The statute is not
in conflict with the Federal Constitution, for the following reasons:
Conceding the statute has the effeqt of regulating commerce,
it is enacted in the exercise of a power which is vested concurrently
in the state and national governments; and as it is not in conflict
with any law of the United States, and as Congress has not enacted
any statute upon its. subject, it cannot be regarded as an encroach-
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ment upon the authority of the general government. Until Con-
gress assume the exercise of authority over the subject of the stat-
ute in question, the state is free to legislate upon it.
In my opinion, regulations of commerce which impose bur-
dens and restrictions thereon only, are forbidden to the states by
the Constitution of the United States. The states are free to enact
all laws which will aid in securing the expeditious and cheap trans-
portation of property used in the commerce of the country. Of
this character are statutes providing for the construction of the
mediums of transportation of property, for its protection while in
transit, and for the protection of the means of transportation used
by common carriers. Enactments prescribing the duties and obli-
gations of carriers are of the same character and class. It must
be remembered that railroads do not constitute commerce. They
are means used by commerce. The corporations operating them
are common carriers employed in the commerce of the country.
Burdens, impediments and restrictions may be imposed on com-
merce by these common carriers. This may be done by unnecessary
delays, and by unreasonable and unjust charges for carrying goods
and the like. Statutes which remove burdens and restrictions im-
posed in this way upon commerce and which protect it from unjust
exactions by common carriers, are not regulations of conmerce
within the contemplation of the Constitution of the United States.
The statute of the state brought in question in the case is of this
character. It was intended and operated to protect and stimulate
commerce by preventing oppressive and discriminating charges for
the transportation of property used in the commerce of the country.
These conclusions, in my opinion, are based upon doctrines well
established by decisions of the United States Supreme Court and
of this court.
The right of the stAe to regulate rail- charges by its own officers, according to
way charges has not been admitted in all their views of the necessities of business
cases. Thus it has been decided that and of justice to the public, without any
the power of a railroad company to reservation in the charter of legislative
charge for the transportation of passen- supervision or control over them, being a
gers and freight is one essential to the part of the franchise as it was granted,
enjoyment of the franchise and must be an act of the legislature which assumes
presumed to have been the consideration for the state the right to regulate what
for which the corporators accepted the under the charter was granted as an
charter, invested their money and as- absolute disci-etion to the corporation,
sumed the obligations imposed on them; viz.: the right to adjust its tariff of
and the power to adjust its tariff of charges for the carriage of passengers
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and freight, undoubtedly impairs the
obligation of the contract in the sense
of the constitutional prohibition, and is
inoperative and void: P. W. - 3.
Railroad Co. v. Bowers, 4 Houst. 507.
See also Sloan v. Pacific Railroad Co.,
61 Mlo. 24. But in this case it was
decided that, regardless of legislation,
the company was responsible for its
breach of duty as a common carrier in
charging exorbitant freights or making
unjust discriminations ; and see Attorney-
General v. Railroad C'ompany, 35 Wis.
428. And Ruggles v. People, 91 Ill.
256, holds that an express grant of
power in a charter of a railway com-
pany to fix the rates of toll to be charged
and to alter and change the same, does
not confer unlimited power, but only the
right to charge reasonable rates, and
what is a maximum rate may be fixed by
the statute.
Other cases, constituting the clear
weight of authority, affirm the constitu-
tionality of regulations as to railway
rates, and such right of regulation by
the state appears now to be firmly
established. Especially when the legis-
lature, in granting the companies their
charters, reserved the right to repeal or
alter them: Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S.
319 ; Peik v. C. J- I. V. Railroad Co.,
94 Id. 165; Munn v. ll1inois, 94 Id.
113; Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 Id. 183;
Anerican Coal Co. v. Consol. Coal Co.,
46 Mld. 15; f. 4- M. Railroad Co. v.
Steiner, 61 Ala. 559 ; . 1 Railroad
Co. v. F. Railroad Co., 9 Cush. 369;
C. 4 A. Railroad Co. v. Peoples, 67
Ill. 11; People v. Ruggles, 91 Id.
256; Attorney-General v. Railroad Com-
panies, 35 Wis. 428 ; Hinckley v. C.
M. 6- St. P. Railroad Co., 38 Id. 196.
Such regulation by the state is not
prohibited by sect. 8, art. 1, United States
Constitution, which gives power to con-
gress to regulate commerce between the
states and with foreign nations, nor by
sect. 9, art. 1, United States Constitution,
which prohibits preferences to the ports
of one state over those of another.
This provision applies only to th federal
government: .Ann v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113.
The legislature, in prescribing max-
imum rates of freight charges, may affix
a money penalty-e. g., a fine of $1000
-for violating the statute fixing the
rates; but no opinion was expressed,
whether the legislature had power to
affix a forfeiture of the company's fran-
chises as a penalty: St. v. . 6- St. P.
Railroad Co., 19 Minn. 434.
Statutes regulating and limiting rates
may classify corporations and establish
different rates for different classes, pro-
vided the same regulations are made for
all in a like situation, and such statutes
do not conflict with state constitutional
provisions requiring uniformity and
equality in general laws: McAunich v.
.A1. 6- l. Railroad Co., 20 Iowa 338 ;
0., B. 6- Q. Railroad Co. v. Iowa, 94
U. S. 155.
The legislature may part with its right
of taxation and afortior with its right to
regulate rates: Sloan v. Pacfic Railroad-
Co., 61 lo. 24.
And where railway companies are
exempt by their charters from state
regulation as to rates, they may relinquish
their right of exemption, or lose it by
consolidation with, or merger in, other
companies not so exempt: Peik v. C. &-
N. W. Railroad Co., 94 U. S. 164;
Shields v. Ohio, 95 Id. 319 ; C., H. &
D. Railroad Co. v. Cole, 29 Ohio St.
126.
So, if a railroad corporation, though
originally chartered without restrictions
as to the right to fix tolls, accepts a lim-
itation or restriction of such powers, on
a valuable consideration, e. g., as one of
the conditions on which it receives aid
from the state, such limitation inheres in
its organic law precisely as if originally
incorporated therein ; and a new corpo-
ration, formed by those purchasing its
property, and succeeding only to the
rights of the old, is bound by such limi-
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tations: M. 4- M. Railroad Co. v.
Steiner, 61 Ala. 559.
It has been decided that the rate on
freight " carried over the whole line of
its road," which furnishes the basis for
the additional fifty per cent. allowed by
the regulating act for the transportation
of "local freight," is the rate charged
on freight taken on at one terminus and
discharged at the other; and not the rate
for freight brought from or carried to a
point beyond the termini of the road.
The rate which furnishes the basis on
which local freight charges must be grad-
uated is the rate prevailing at the time
of shipment ; and rates at any particular
time in the past furnish no reliable
guide for ascertaining present rates : Il.
4- 1. Railroad Co. v. Steiner, 61 Ala.
559.
A statute providing that railroad com-
panies "may, for the transportation of
local freight demand and receive, not
exceeding fifty per cent. more than
the rate charged for the transportation
of the same description of freight, over
the whole line of its road," does not au-
thorize the addition of fifty per cent. on
the charge over the whole road, irrespect-
ive of the distance, the freight may be
carried, but only an additional fifty per
cent. more per mile, for the distance
local freight is carried, than the per mile
rate charged on goods carried over the
whole line: . 6- M. Railroad Co. v.
Steiner, 61 Ala. 559.
By an Act of Assembly it. was pro-
vided that " rates for toll and transpor-
tation may be regulated in such manner
as the company may deem most advis-
able; provided, that the maximum
charges for toll and transportation shall
not exceed four cents per mile for
freight." A subsequent act amended the
proviso so as to read "average charges
for toll and transportation." It was held
that the company might impose more
than four cents per mile on some charges,
so that by making others less the general
average should not exceed four cents ;
that the adjustment of tolls was not
required to be made so as to bear equally
on each individual, but was to be made
between the whole road and the entire
public who used it; that the requirement
of the statute was satisfied by fixing
different charges per mile for different
kinds of freight; that the company may
discriminate in favor of longer distances;
that " average charges" are charges at
a mean rate ascertained by dividing the
entire receipts by the whole quantity of
tonnage, reduced to a common standard
of tens moved one mile ; that the charges
against the plaintiff, averaged by the
whole amount of business of the com-
pany, were less than four per cent. ; by
that done for him alone they were more
than five per cent., and that the former
was the proper estimate, and the charges
were not excessive : Hersh v. A. C. Rail-
road Co., 74 Penn. St. 18.1.
In Wisconsin, a railway company can-
not, by showing that the amount charged
was no more than a reasonable com-
pensation for the service rendered, re-
cover more than the maximum rate fixed
by law : C., 1lf. 4- St. . Railroad Co.
v. Acldey, 94 U. S. 179.
A statutory provision that no reduc-
tion shall be made in the rates of fare
and charges for freight allowed to rail-
way companies organized under such
statute, unless where their net profits for
the previous ten years amount to ten per
cent. on their capital, is in the nature of
a contract and binding on the state.
There are railway companies who have
not relinquished their right to be gov-
erned by such statutory provision, and
not having realized a net profit of ten per
cent. on their capital for the ten years
next preceding the enactment of the stat-
ute they are not bound by provisions of
the act reducing their rates of freight or
fare: Iron Railroad Co. v. Lawrence F.
Co., 29 Ohio St. 208.
The grounds of the right of the gov-
ernment to regulate the prices of trans-
portation are several :
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I. PUBLIC UsE.-The devotion-of the
property of a person or corporation to a
public use warrants governmental regu-
lation of such use and the prices charge-
able for it. See Lord H.,LE, Do Jure
Mlaris, I Harg. Law Tracts 6; Blot v.
Stennelt, 8 T. R. 606 ; Aldnutt v. Tng!as,
12 East 527 ; Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala.
(N. S.) 140; 1aunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113, and cases supra.
What is a public use of property?
Chief Justice WAITE says, somewhat
vaguely, that "property does become
clothed with a public interest when used
in a manner to make it of public conse-
quence, and affect the community at
large;" and he continues, "when, there-
fore, one devotes his property to a use in
which the public has an interest, he, in
effect, grants to the public an interest in
that use, and must submit to be con-
trolled by the public for the common
good, to the extent of the interest he has
thus created. He may withdraw his
grant by discontinuing the use; but so
long as he maintains the use, he must
submit to the control: iann v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 113. He held that the business
of a common carrier was so "affected
with a public interest" as to be, on this
ground, subject to legislative regulation.
So also were held ferrymen, hackmen,
wharfingers, bakers, millers, warehouse-
men and innkeepers.
FiEL, J., dissented ; said he, "there
is no business or enterprise involving
expenditures to any extent which is not
of public consequence, and which does
not affect the community at large. There
is no trade or manufacture, and no avo-
cation which does not, in a greater or
less extent, affect the community and in
which the public has an interest in the
sense used by the court:" Stone v. Wis-
consin, 94 U. S. 181, 185.
1The public," said he again, "1 is in-
terested in the manufacture of cotton,
woollen and silken fabrics, in the con-
struction of machinery, in the printifig
and publication of books and periodicals,
and in the making of utensils of every
variety, useful and ornamental; indeed
there is hardly an enterprise or business
engaging the attention and labor of any
considerable portion of the community in
which the public has not an interest, in
the sense in which that term is used by
the court :" Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
141 ; and he thought the principle
of the court "subversive of the rights
of private property." Whether or not
this dissent rests upon solid foundations,
the decisions of the courts pretty clearly
establish the fact that in the eye of the
law the property of railways is devoted
to the use of the public, is "affected
with a public interest," and that, there-
fore, its use and the prices chargeable
therefor are subject to regulation by the
state.
The Supreme Court of Texas, speak-
ing of the distinction between devoting
property to a private and to a public use,
decided that a business, which is strictly
juris privati, does not become jutis pub-
lid, by reason of the fact that those car-
rying it on have become incorporated by
the legislature, nor merely by reason of
the extent of such business. If the mag-
nitude of a particular business is such,
and the persons affected by it are so
numerous that the interest qf society de-
mands that it should be relegated to the
-class of occupations juris publici, the ex-
ercise of such power is for the legislature
(if not restrained by the Constitution)
and not for the judicial department.
In the absence of legislation a person
who has not put his property and services
to public use, by the character of the
business in which he is engaged, does not
do so by reason of combination with
others in a like business, though he is
enabled thereby to exact from those who
may employ him unreasonable and ex-
tortionate charges for services rendered :
Ladd v. Southern C. P. 4- M. Co., 12
Leg. News 418.
II. USE OF PUBLIc PROPERTY.-
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The property of railway companies is
largely public, and belongs to the gov-
ernment, by which it is, therefore, sub-
ject to regulation. For example, a
railway company's franchises, its right
to construct and to operate its railroad
belongs to the government. It is only
held by the railway corporation in trust
for the public benefit. It is in all cases
valuable, and in many instances enor-
mously valuable. Under it the com-
panies condemn and take private pro-
perty for their line. The company is as
to this right the agent of the government
conferring it, and is bound as much as
its principal to use the right for the
common welfare. Therefore, as the
agent of the government, possessing and
using public property, a railway com-
pany is subject to regulation.
In. MONOPOLY OR COMBINATION.
-When any person or corporation has
obtained the sole power of dealing in
any species of goods, or of dealing with
a country or market, by engrossing the
articles in the market, or by license
from the government, the latter has
always asserted and exercised its right
to regulate and control such person or
corporation so as to stop and prevent
extortion agd oppression. "A monop-
oly, it is said, hath three incidents mis-
chievous to the public: 1. The raising,
of the price; 2. The commodity will
not be so good; 3. The impoverishing
of poor artificers:" Darcy v. Allen, 11
Coke 84. And monopolous grants were
decided to be illegal. In 1624 they
were abolished by statute in England.
It would be strange if the legislature
had the power to abolish monopolies but
could not regulate them. The greater
power certainly includes the less. As
to points with which a single railroad is
the only means of communication, such
railroad is an undoubted monopoly.
And where several railways run to a
city, a monopoly is established of rail-
way transportation to that city where
they combine and form "pools," or
"freight associations." These "pools"
or similar combinations are clearly ille-
gal; and as monopolies, any railway
or combination of railways, are subject
to legislative control.
But railway regulative legislation is
at present insufficient and defective.
Only about fifteen of the states have
attempted it to any great extent, and
their legislation reaches only to domestic
traffic. The larger portion of railway
business, interstate traffic, is subject to
no regulation. The state governments
cannot regulate it. The national gov-
ernment has not done so. Nor are all
the subjects proper for regalation been
provided for, even in those states which
have legislated most vigorously against
railways. Legislation for the preven-
tion of strikes by railway employees,
and the consequent stoppage of railway
facilities, has not yet been attempted.
Nor are there any regulations as to the
management and funding of the vast
and rapidly increasing railway debt.
Nor is there any system of inspection of
railway equipments and appliances.
Such inspection should be made by the
state. It would prevent such disasters
as that at Ashtabula bridge--and in
passing it may be noted that bridge
accidents during the year 1881 were
double in number those of previous
years. Safety to persons and property
in transit over railways-fairness and
evenhanded justice to the public that
patronizes railways, demand their
reasonable control and regulation by
state and federal governments. It is
hoped that such regulation will not be
postponed.
ADLBET HAMILTOv.
Chicago.
LANGDON v. UNION MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO.
Circuit Court, IEastern -District of Michigan,
LANGDON v. UNION MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.
A person may insure his own life and make the policy payable to any one, though
such payee has no interest in the life of the insured. Hence, where a policy was
taken out upon the life of one, and made payable to another (who had no legal
interest in it) in case he survived the assured, and there was strong evidence tend-
ing to show that the transaction was a mere wager, Reld, that it was properly left
to the jury to say whether the policy was obtained in good faith, and not for the
purpose of speculating on the hazard of a life in which the plaintiff had no interest.
An applicant for a policy was asked the following question: " Has any applica-
tion ever been made either to this or any other company, upon which a policy was
not issued ?" Held, that a negative answer was not improper, although an applica_
tion had been made to another company which had not been finally passed upon by
that company.
An applicant made a full statement of all the facts regarding the name of
his usual medical attendant to the sub-agent who took the application, and the sub-
agent, putting his own construction upon the facts, filled in the wrong name: Reld,
that the company could not take advantage of the mistake.
THIS was an action upon a policy of life insurance upon the
life of Augustus E. Baker, "for the sole and separate use and
benefit of his brother-in-law, William W. Langdon. But in case
of his previous death to revert to the insured." The facts in
relation to this policy were substantially as follows: The agent
of the defendant solicited Langdon, the plaintiff, to insure his life
in his company. This application plaintiff declined, but said to the
agent that he might go to his brother-in-law, Baker, and get -him to
make an application for a policy, and the plaintiff would pay the
premiums. Baker was the plaintiff's brother-in-law, but he had
no other interest in his life. The court left it to the jury to say
whether the policy was taken out in good faith by Baker, with a
designation of the plaintiff as a person to receive the money, or
whether it was intended by the plaintiff as a wagering contract
upon Baker's life. The jury returned a verdict for the amount
of the policy.
Motion was made for a new trial upon the ground of misdirection
upon this and other points stated in the opinion.
3loore & Canfield, for plaintiff.
H. H. Duffield, for defendant.
BRowN, D. J.-The policy in this case purported upon its face to
be taken out by the insure upoA his own life, but the evidence
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shows that it was taken at the suggestion of his brother-in-law, who
sent the agent of the company to Baker, and paid all the premiums
upon the policy. It was made payable to the plaintiff in case he
survived Baker. Baker's life had previously been insured in other
companies for plaintiff's benefit to the amount of $6000. He had
also made application to the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Company for a policy of $3000, which -was rejected. Upon the
trial, the question was left to the jury to say whether the policy was
obtained in good faith, and not for the purpose of speculation on the
hazard of a life in which the plaintiff had no legal interest. It was
thought that the fact that the policy provided in express terms
that in case of the previous death of the plaintiff it should revert
to the insured, and hence that the plaintiff's interest was contingent
upon his surviving Baker, was some evidence to go to the jury that
the policy was taken out in good faith. It was certainly consistent
with an understanding that the plaintiff wished to hold the policy
during his life as security for the premiums, with a resulting trust
in favor of Baker's wife, 'who was his own sister.
It is now well settled in the federal courts that a party cannot
take out an insurance upon his own life and assign the policy, either
contemporaneously with its execution or subsequently, to a person
having no legal interest in his life, although the decisions of the
state courts upon this point are conflicting: Warnock v. Davis,
104 U. S. 775; Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643.
But there is no case, to my knowledge, which holds that a party
may not insure his own life and make the policy payable to any one
he may select, though such person have no legal interest in his life.
This point was first held in the case of Campbell v. New England
HAfut. Life Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 381. The policy in this case was
taken out by Campbell upon his life, payable to him, his executors,
etc., for the benefit of the plaintiff, in very nearly the same terms
as are contained in the policy under consideration. The only
substantial difference in the two cases is that the premium in this
case was paid by the assured, and not by the beneficiary. So in the
_Provident Life Ins. Co. v. Baum, 29 Ind. 236, it was said to be
"beyond question that a person has an insurable interest in his own
life, and that he may effect such insurance, and appoint any one to
receive the money, in case of his death during the existence of such
a policy." This was an accident policy in similar terms. Although
this exact question has not often been decided, the intimations of
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the courts are uniformly in the same direction. Lemon v. Phcenix
Hut. Life ins. Co., 38 Conn. 294, 302; Guardian Mut. Life
Ins. -0o. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35; American L. d Hf. Ins. Co. v.
Bobertshaw, 26 Penn. St. 189; .airchild v. N . Hut. Life
Ass'n, 51 Vt. 624; Olmstead v. Keyes, 11 Ins. Law J. 55.
Hence, the production of the policy, proof of payment of pre-
miums, and of the insured's death, were sufficient to make a Prima
facie case for the plaintiff without evidence of interest in him.
The facts, however, that the policy was taken out by Baker at the
plaintiff's instigation, and that the premiums were paid by plaintiff,
taken in connection with Baker's position in life, his total want of
means, and the further fact that the plaintiff had obtained policies
upon his life to the amount of $6000 in addition to this, were
strong evidence to show that the transaction was a mere wager upon
his life, nothwithstanding the fact of Baker's reversionary interest.
The case was submitted to the jury in supposed conformity to the
opinion of the Supreme Court in Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Schzeffer, 94 U. S. 67. See, also, .. ,tna Life Ins. Co. v. Prance,
Id. 561; Brockway v. Hut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 10 Ins. Law J.
763-769; Wainwrigh~t v. Bland, 1 Moody & R. 481; Swick v.
ffome Life Ins. Co., 2 Dill. 160. The mere payment of the pre-
miums by plaintiff is not conclusive evidence that the policy was
taken out by him: Triston v. Hardey, 14 Beav. 232; Armstrong
v. HMut. Life Ins. Co., 13 Reporter 711. Were it an original
question, I should be disposed to say that a policy taken out by one
person for the benefit of another could no more be supported with-
out evidence of legal interest in the beneficiary, than a policy
assigned to one having no interest in the life. But a large number
of cases seem to make this distinction, and I know of none which
reject it. Under all the circumstances, I think the question was
properly submitted to the jury.
There was no error in the charge respecting the prior application
made to the Massachusetts company. In the application in this
case the following question was asked: "Has any application ever
been made, either to this or any other company, upon which a policy
was not issued ?" The answer was, "No." The evidence showed
that upon the day before Baker made this application he signed a
written application for a policy in the Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Company, and submitted to an examination by the sur-
geon of the company. This examination proving unsatisfactory,
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the surgeon certified upon the back of the application that the risk
was an unfit one. The application was then returned to the general
agent of the company, who forwarded it to the home office of the
company in Springfield, Massachusetts, where it was rejected. If
the question had been, "Has any application ever been made to
this or any other company upon which a policy has not been
issued," I should have had little difficulty in holding that the
answer was false; but I think that there is a distinction between
the words " was not" and "has not been" issued. I think a per-
son of ordinary intelligence might answer "no" to the first form of
the question, supposing that the company desired to know whether
an application had been made and rejected. But the application
in this case had not been rejected. The examining surgeon had
no authority beyond his certificate as to the physical condition of
the party examined. Notwithstanding this certificate, the company
might have issued the policy if it had chosen to do so. It did not,
in fact, reject the application until some time after the application
in this case had been made to the defendant. The question as put
was somewhat ambiguous, and I think it contemplates, when fairly
and reasonably construed, that the company desired to know whether
an application had been made and rejected. So long as the matter
was still pending, it does not seem to me that a negative answer to
the question was an improper one.
There was no error in the refusal of the defendant's request that
Baker's statement of his age in the application was entitled to no
greater weight than any other statement of his as to his age. The
request asked for a charge upon the weight of testimony. Parties
have no right to this. The court may, in its discretion, comment
upon the testimony, and even express an opinion upon it, and upon
the weight to which the several items of testimony are entitled, but
counsel have no legal right to such instructions.
Baker did misstate the name of his medical attendant, and upon
the first trial this misstatement was held fatal to a recovery ; but
upon the last trial it appeared that he made a full and fair statement
of the facts regarding his medical attendant to Mr. Hitchcock, the
person who took his application, stating that Dr. Loring had been
his medical attendant in Providence, and up to the time he removed
to Detroit; that since he had been here Dr. Book had treated him
for a disorder of the nose, and, being evidently in some doubt as to
what the correct answer was to the question, he left it to Hitchcock to
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make the answer. He, it seems, put his own construction upon his
language, and advised him, under that state of facts, to answer that
Dr. Loring was his medical attendant.
It is claimed by the defence that the company is not estopped by
this statement, because Hitchcock was not the agent of the company,
but a sub-agent, holding his appointment from the general agent of
the company, Mr. Patton. Had Hitchcock been the general agent
of the company, there can be but little doubt that the case would
have fallen within the decision in Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall.
232. While it is true that Hitchcock did not hold his appointment
from the company, but from Mr. Patton, the contract between Pat-
ton and the company, produced upon the motion for a new trial,
shows that it was contemplated that Patton should appoint sub-
agents, whose duty it would undoubtedly be to take applications.
Besides, it is a well-known custom of insurance agents to employ
sub-agents of this kind to take applications, which are forwarded by
the general agent of the company and upon which policies are con-
stantly issued. Under such circumstances it seems to me, upon prin-
ciple as well as authority, that the company ought not to say that
the construction put by a sub-agent upon a statement made by the
insured as to his medical attendant (a statement made in entire
'good faith) was false. . I do not contend but that if the statement
was false in fact and designedly so, or if it was made with intent
to impose upon or mislead the company, the mere knowledge of the
sub-agent would prevent the company from taking advantage of it.
But where, as in this case, the applicant states all the facts, and
the sub-aigent puts his own construction upon them, I think the
company is estopped: Woodbury Savings Bank v. Charter Oak
Ins. Co., 31 Conn. 517 ; Mayers v. Hut. Life Ins. Co., 3 Ins. Law
J. 662; Bodine v. Exct. Fire Ins." Co., 51 N. Y. 117; 'Fan
Schoick v. Niagara Ins. Co., 68 Id. 434; Strong v. Stewart, 9
Heisk. 137; Furnas v. Prankman, 6 Neb. 429; Brown v. Ins.
Co., 45 Mo. 221; Am. Ins. Co. v. Lesem, 39 Ill. 314. Themotion
for a new trial must be denied.
it is a general principle of law, ap- must be what is known as an "insurable
plicable alike in cases of fire, life and interest," otherwise it is evident that the
marine insurance, that itis absolutely contract is a mere wager between the
necessary to the validity of the contract parties, prohibited by the clearest dictates
of insurance that the person insured of public policy. In no class of insur-
should have some interest in the subject ance cases does the rule above laid down
matter of the contract. Such interest apply with more force than in cases of
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life insurance. That the duration of a
man's life should be permitted to become
the subject of a wager is of itself
a monstrous proposition. But when in
connection with the matter, we consider
that it is directly to the interest of the
insured in such case that the life in ques-
tion should terminate, to sustain the
contract seems like holding out a premium
to commit murder. Very forcible are
the views expressed by the court in an
opinion in a recent case upon this sub-
ject.
"It is a general rule of law that no
one can procure valid insurance on a
life unless he has an interest in that life.
I may insure my own life, for I have an
interest in it. But an entire stranger
to me, one who has no interest in my life
as a creditor or otherwise, cannot take out
a valid policy on it. Should he procure
such policy the law would condemn it as
a mere wager, a bet on my life, a gam-
bling contract, and there could be no
recovery thereon. This rule prevails
not in the interest of insurance companies
or out of regard for them. The rule has
its foundation in good morals and sound
publicpolicy. Ithasbeenwell said of such
wager policies that ' if valid they would
not only afford facilities for a demoraliz-
ing system of gaming, but furnish strong
temptations to the party interested to
bring about if possible the event insured
against.' The annals of crime furnish
more than one instance where murder
has been perpetrated by the holders of
such policies, that they might reap the
fruits of speculative insurance upon the
life of their victim. If an entire stranger
to me were permitted to take out insur-
ance on my life, his sole interest, you
must perceive, would be in my speedy
death. The law, therefore, wisely takes
from him the temptation to bring about
the event by forbidding such contract.
The evils of gambling in such policies
are also apparent and great, and therefore
the law will not sanction insurance
obtained for the purpose of speculating
upon the hazard of a life in which the
assured has no interest :" Brockway v.
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 9 Fed.
Rep. 249.
The law, therefore, refuses to enforce a
policy of life insurance knowingly issued
to one who was not of kindred to the
subject of the insurance nor in any way
interested in his life: Mflutual Benefit
Association v. Hoyt, 10 Ins. L. J. 626.
Generally where one person takes out
a policy on the life of another he is bound
to prove affirmatively, In suing on the
policy, that he had an insurable interest :
Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan,
80 Ill. 35.
Where, however, the company defend-
ant in its pleadings sets up some other
defence, it is not at liberty subsequently
to aver and depend upon a lack of insur-
able interest in the plaintiff : Forbes v.
American Mlutual Life Ins. Co., 15 Gray
(Mass.) 249.
The question next arises as to who
may be considered as having an insurable
interest in the life of another person.
This is a question very difficult to
answer. In a recent case in the Supreme
Court of the United States, FIFLD, J.,
thus lays down the rule: "It is not
easy to define with precision what will
in all cases constitute an insurable
interest, so as to take the contract out
of the class of wager polieies. It may
be stated generally, however, to be such
an interest, arising from the relations of
the party obtaining the insurance, either
as creditor of or surety for the assured,
or from the ties of blood or marriage to
him, as will justify a reasonable expecta-
tion of advantage or benefit from the con-
tinuance of his life. It is not necessary
that the expectation of advantage or
benefit, should be always capable of
pecuniary estimation ; for a parent has
an insurable interest in the life of his
child and a child in the life of his parent;
a husband in the life of his wife and a
wife in the life of her husband. The
natural affection in cases of this kind is
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considered as more powerful-as opera-
ting more efficaciously-to protect the life
of the insured than any other considera-
tion. But in all cases there must he a rea-
sonable ground founded upon the relations
of the parties to each other, either
pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to ex-
pect some benefit or advantage from the
continuance of the life of the assured,
otherwise the contract is a mere wager,
by which the party taking the policy is
directly interested in the early death of
the assured. Such policies have a tendency
to create a desire forthe event. They
are, therefore, independently of any
statute on the subject, condemned as
being against public policy :" Warnock
v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775.
We may now proceed to consider the
adjudications on this subject.
PAaT HAS INSURABLE INTEItEST IN
nis owx LIFE. Every man is to be
regarded as having an insurable interest
in his own life. He may therefore effect
an insurance thereon which, in the event
of there being no other specification, will
be payable on the death of the insured
to his personal representatives.
HUSBAND AND WIPE. A wife has an
insurable interest in her husband's life
arising out of the right and expectation
on her part of support and maintenance
from him as long as he remains alive:
Gambs v. Covenant Life Ins. Co., 50
Mo. 44; St. John v. American Life Ins.
Co., 2 Duer 419 ; Baker v. Union
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 43 N. Y. 283;
McKee v. Phenix Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 383;
Equitable Life Ins. Society v. Paterson,
41 Ga. 338 ; Holabird v. Atlantic Ins.
Co., 2 Duer 166.
A husband has also, it would seem,
an insurable interest in his wife's life,
arising out of the right which he has to
her society and assistance. Where the
parties are legally married at the time
the policy is taken out a subsequent
absolute divorce will not invalidate it, but
the same remains in full force: Connec-
ticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94
U. S. 457.
A wife has such an interest in a policy
taken out for her benefit'upon her hus-
band's life that the riglits under the same
will pass to her children if her husband
predecease her: .Hutson v. Merrifield,
51 Ind. 24.
A woman engaged to be married to a
man has, it seems, an insurable interest
in his life; and this is but reasonable,
considering the prospective advantages
which will accrue to her if he keeps his
contract: Chisholm v. N¢ational Capital
Lffe Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 213.
PARENT ANe CHILD. It was origi-
nally decided in England that a father
bad not an insurable interest in the life
of his son: Halford v.1iymer, 10 B. &
C. 725. Many decisions in this country
are in opposition to this doctrine:
Mitchell v. Union Life Ins. Co., 45 Me.
104 ; Loomis v. Eagle Life and Health
Ins. Co., 6 Gray 396; Hoyt v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 3 Bosw. 440; Re-
serve Life Ins. Co. v. Kane, 81 Penn.
St. 154; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457; Wil-
liams v. Washington Life Ins. Co., 31
Iowa 541.
But in most if not all of these cases,
the dependency of the parent on the
child for support was shown to exist to a
greater or less extent. They cannot,
therefore, be considered as quite con-
clusive on the point that the relation-
ship alone constitutes an insurable
interest. It seems, however, that a
mother has an insurable interest in the
life of her son, irrespective of the ques-
tion whether she is or is not dependent
upon him: Reif v. Union Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 17 Ins. Chron. 13. A. child
has not an insurable interest in the
life of the parent, unless his dependency
on him for support be shown, or at least
some direct advantage likely to flow
from the continuance of the parent's
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life: Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Hogan, 80 Ill. 35.
The citation above given from War-
nock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775, seems to
imply that the mere relationship of child
to parent, or of parent to child, consti-
tutes of itself a sufficient insurable
interest in each ,on the life of the other.
We submit, however, that the adjudged
cases do not warrant such a conclusion.
No settled criterion has been laid
down in the books. We would suggest
that eventually the law may be settled
by a consideration of whether, in any
case, positive pecuniary benefit is accru-
ing to the insured by reason of the con-
tinuance of the life in question, or
whether, in any case, the insured could
legally call upon the party upon whose
life the policy is effected to contribute to
his support. Either or both of these
elements is necessary to constitute an
insurable interest. If neither of them
is present, it is submitted that no case
has as yet decided that an insurable
interest exists.
OTHER RIAT ONs. The principles
above laid down apply with equal force
in the case of moire remote relatives.
A brother has no insurable interest in
the life of a brother as such: Lewis v.
Piwenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 39 Conn.
100. Nor has an uncle in the life of his
nephew: Singleton v. St. Louis Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 66 Mo. 63. A sister has
an insurable interest in the life of her
brother upon whom she is dependent for
support: Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. 115.
And in some cases it seems even al-
though this element of dependence 'be
not present: .Etna Life Ins. Co. v.
France, 94 U. S. 561; Goodwin v.
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 73
N. Y. 430.
PARTNERs. One partner has, in cer-
tain cases, an insurable interest in the
life of his copartner, as, for example,
where he has contributed the capital and
his copartner the skill : Valton v. Na-
tional Loan Fund Association Society, 20
N. Y. 32. And where one party fur-
nishes to another the outfit for a trading
or mining venture, under an agreement
to share the profits, the first-named
party has an insurable interest in the
life of the other: Mlorrell v. Trenton
Mutual Life and Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cush.
282 ; Hoyt v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
3 Bosw. 440; Miller v. Eagle Life and
Health Ins. Co., 2 E. D. Smith 268;
Bevin v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 23 Conn. 244; Trenton Mutual
Life and Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 4
Zab. (N. J.) 576.
MASTE AND SERVANT. Where a
master has hired a skilled servant for a
certain term in advance, he has an in-
surable interest in the life of the ser-
vant: Hebdon v. West, 3 Best & Smith
578.
DEBTOR AsND CREITOR. A cred-
itor has an insurable interest in the life
of his debtor, at least to the extent of
his debt, and the policy will remain in
force notwithstanding the Statute of
Limitations may have run against the
claim: Rawls v. American Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 282; Brockway v.
Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., 9 Fed. Rep.
249; Dalby v. India and London Life
Ins. Association, 15 C. B. 365. A
creditor may not, however, insure the
life of his debtor for an amount largely
in excess of his debt: Fox v. Pennsyl-
vania lutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Big. L. &
A. Ins. Cas. 458 ; Morrell v. Trenton
Miutual Life and Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cush.
282.
MAY A PARTY INSURE HIS OWN
IzFE POP THE BENEFIT OF ANOTHER?
A person may clearly take out a policy
of insurance on his own life, payable to
and for the benefit of a creditor or any
other person having an insurable inter-
est in that life: American Life and
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Health Ins. Co. v. .Robertshaw, 26 Penn.
St. 189. He may provide, therefore,
that out of the policy the amount of the
debt shall first be paid to the creditor,
and the balance to the debtor's family:
American Life and Health Ans. Co. v.
Robertshaw, supra. It is also, of course,
common for a party to take out a policy
himself, payable to and for the benefit
of his wife and children.
May, however, a party take out a
policy on his own life payable to one not
having an insurable interest therein?
The principal case seems to settle that
he can, and there are many dicta in sup-
port of this proposition : Campbell v.
New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 98
Mass. 381; Lemon v. .Phcnix Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 38 Conn. 294; Connec-
ticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer,
94 U. S. 457; Olmstead v. Kreyes, 11
Ins. L. J. 55; Provident Life Ins. and
Inv. Co. v. Baum, 29 Ind. 236 ; Fair-
child v. North Eastern Mutual Life Asso-
ciation, 51 Vt. 625.
These cases are, however, clearly con-
fined to instances where the party him-
self pays the premium, and is the real
actor in the transaction. Even then the
wisdom of the principle may be ques-
tioned, as it undoubtedly puts tempta-
tion in the way of the party beneficially
interested to terminate the life insured.
Such a transaction cannot, in any event,
be made the cover for a mere gambling
venture. Where, therefore, the party
whose life is insured does not act wholly
on his own account, but by the procure-
ment and at the instigation of the bene-
ficiary by whom the premiums are fur-
nished, the contract is regarded as a
mere wager, and bannot be enforced.
See Wainwright v. Bland, 1 Mee. & W.
32.
ASSIGNMENT OF THE POLICY. May
a person who has taken out a policy of
insurance bonafide on his own life, and
in his own name, subsequently assign it
to another party ? Undoubtedly he
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may do so to the extent that such other
* person has an insurable interest in his
life; but the question whether he may
assign it to one having no such interest,
is extremely difficult of solution.
Some authorities distinctly decide that
he may so assign it: Valton v. National
Fund Life Association Co., 20 N. Y.
32; St. John v. American Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 13 Id. 31 ; Fairchild v. North
Eastern Mutual Life Association, 51 Vt.
625. These proceed upon the principle
that a man may do what he pleases with
his own, and that since the policy be-
longs absolutely to him he may dispose
of it as he sees proper.
Other authorities hold that there can
be no such assignment: Fanklin Life
Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116;
Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Sefton, 53 Id.
380. "All the objections," says the
court in the case just above cited, 11 that
exist against the issuing of a policy to
one upon the life of another in whose life
the former has no insurable interest,
seem to us to exist against his holding
such policy by mere purchase and as-
signment from another. In either case
the holder of such policies is interested
in the death, rather than in the life of
the party assured. The law ought to
be, and we think it clearly is, opposed
to such speculations in human life. In
our opinion no one should hold a policy
upon the life of another in whose life
he has no insurable interest at the time
he acquired the policy, whether the
policy be issued to him directly from
the insurer, or whether he acquired the
policy by purchase or assignment from
another."
To somewhat the same effect are the
views expressed on this point by the
Supreme Court of the United States in
Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643, and
Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775.
There is, therefore, plainly a hopeless
conflict of authority on the point. As
to one matter, however, all the cases
agree. A party cannot be allowed
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to take out a policy in his own name
and subsequently transfer it to another,
where the clear intent is to evade the
law and enter into a wagering contract.
Where, therefore, the original taking out
of the policy, and the subsequent assign-
ment, constitute one and the same trans-
action, and are intended to enable one
having no interest in the life insured to
hold an insurance thereon, the contract
is void: Swick v. Home Ins. Co., 2
Dill. 160; Brockway v. Mutual Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 249 ; Stevens
v. Warren, 101 Mass. 566. In the last
case the court said: "If the assignee
has no interest in the life of the subject
of the insurance which would sustain a
policy to himself, the assignment would
take effect only as a designation by
mutual consent of the contracting par-
ties, of the person who should be entitled
to receive the proceeds when due, in-
stead of the personal representatives of
the assured. And if it should ippear
that the assignment was a cover for a
speculating risk, contravening the gen-
eral policy of the law, it would not be
sustained."
Whether or not the intention has been
to effect a wagering policy, is in every
case for the jury under proper instruc-
tions. The circumstance that the pre-
miums are paid by the assignee in the
first instance, is, of course, strong evi-
dence of an intent by the parties tc
evade the law.
It should be observed that the two
cases in the Supreme Court of the Uni-
ted States, above referred to, viz., Cam-
msack v. Davis, 15 Wall. 643, and
Warnock v. Lewis, 104 U. S. 775, al-
though proceeding on the broad prin-
ciple that an assignment of the policy to
one having no insurable interest in the
life in question is invalid, are both
explicable on a different ground. In
both there were the clearest evidences of
intent to evade the prohibition of the
law against wagering policies. The
assignee of the policy was in both cases
the real principal who paid the pre-
miums and effected the insurance.
The taking of the policy in the name
of the other party and the subsequent
assignment, were mere flimsy pretences
which did not avail to hide the substance
of the transaction.
A party may insure his life with the
money of his creditor, and afterwards
assign the policy to the creditor. Such
a transaction is not obnoxious to any
principle of law: Cunningham v. Smith's
Administrator, 70 Penn. St. 450.
Where by the terms of the policy no
assignment is permitted, an attempted
assignment is of course invalid: Stevens
v. Warren, 101 Mass. 566.
LAvRENCE LEWIS, JR.
-Kentucky Court of Appeals.
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Where the owner of an entire estate sells a portion, the purchaser takes his pur-
chase with the burden and benefits as they appear.
A. was the owner of two houses, one built entirely upon one lot, and the other
upon the adjoining lot and upon five feet of the first lot ; a brick partition wall was
all that divided the two houses, each house serving as a support for the other. At
the same time, by separate deeds, he conveyed one lot to D. and the other lot to W.,
who conveyed them at different times to H. and K. H. owned the house that stood
five feet over on K.'s lot. K. took the roof from H.'s house to the extent it cov-
ered the strip of ground between the wall and the real division line, aut every
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other rafter supporting the roof, took up the floor of the second story of H.'s room
over the strip, and made several openings in the wall for the purpose of making
improvements to his own house, leaving H.'s house entirely exposed. Held, that
H. had an easement in so much of K.'s lot as was necessary for the support of H.'s
house.
K. could not first create a necessity for light and air on the side of his house, by
changing the arrangement of his own house, and then make that a pretext to re-
move so much of H.'s house as rested upon K.'s lot.
When the injury is irreparable or permanent ruin to property will ensue from
the wrongful act, a court of equity will interfere by injunction to prevent the injury.
And if necessary the court may, after the commencement of the injury, compel
by mandatory injunction, the restoration of the property to its original condition.
APPEAL from a decree refusing an injunction. The facts are
fully stated in the opinion which was delivered by
PRYOR, J.-George Anderson being the owner in fee of a lot of
ground, in the city of Louisville, upon which he had erected cer-
tain buildings, severed the lot and buildings upon it by conveyances
made at the same time, to one Doup and Wright. There were two
rooms, or rather two houses, on the lot, divided by a partition wall,
at the time of the conveyance, Doup acquiring by his purchase
one of the rooms, and Wright the othel. They purchased, as
stated, of Anderson, who was the sole owner in the year 1871.
The lots fronted on Washington street, between Floyd and Preston
streets. The appellant, Mr. Henry, purchased the lot sold Doup,
and the appellee the lot sold Wright. The conveyance from An-
derson to Doup describes the lot as running 183 feet east of Floyd
street, and thence with Main street eastwardly twenty-six and three-
twelfths feet, thence westwardly 204 feet to Washington street, &c.,
to have and to hold the same with all the appurtenances thereon to
the second party and his heirs for ever.
The agreed facts show conveyances were made by Doup and
Wright to these parties, and that they entered into possession. It
also appears that the boundary dividing the two lots or houses is a
straight line, and that the wall separating the two buildings is all
on the lot owned by the appellee, having a strip of at least five feet
of appellee's lot beyond the wall and adjacent to appellant's lot.
Appellant's house is a two-story metal roofed brick building, but,
according to the proof, of but little value. The appellee desired to
remodel his building and to convert it into a residence or rooms
suitable for that purpose; and as the wall stood entirely upon his
lot, with a space of five feet of ground in addition, belonging to
him, lying between the wall and the lot of the appellant, he began
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the improvement. The appellant's house had for its support this
partition wall with the roof, rafters and joists all resting upon it;
and was so constructed by Anderson, at the time he sold to Doup
and Wright, the vendors of these parties. No change had been
made in the building affecting the rights of the parties in any man-
ner, until shortly before the institution of this action in March 1880,
when the appellee took the roof from appellant's house, to the ex-
tent that it covered the strip of ground between the wall and the
real division line, cut loose every other rafter supporting the roof,
took up the floor of the second story of appellant's room over the
strip, and proceeded to make various openings in the wall, for the
purpose of making his improvements, leaving the inside of appel-
lant's house entirely exposed. Notice was given the appellant, by
a postal card, of the intention of the appellee to make the change.
The work began on the 29th of March, and this action in equity to
obtain an injunction to prevent the injury was commenced on the
12th of April. The chancellor, upon the facts stated, refused the
injunction, upon the ground that the wall was not a party wall and
no irreparable injury could result to the appellant from the conduct
of appellee, as she could build a wall on her own lot to support
the roof, and if wronged by the appellee, her remedy was at law
and not in equity.
It is not necessary to determine whether the wall dividing the
two houses is or is not, in a strict legal sense, a party wall. It is
an easement or servitude claimed by the appellant, by reason of the
grant, and the appellee had no right to deprive her of the use and
enjoyment of this right without her consent. The reason the
appellee gives for the illegal acts complained of is that he desired
to obtain light and air for the convenience of the building in its
altered condition. He first created the necessity for light and air
by remodeling his dwelling, and in order to obtain it undertook
the destruction of appellant's property. When Anderson sold and
conveyed this property to Doup, under whom appellant claims, the
wall was the support of appellant's building, and it will not be pre-
tended that this vendor could have torn off the roof of appellant's
house that he might enjoy the benefit of the strip of ground that is
now claimed belongs to the appellee.
If he would be estopped from forcibly taking possession of appel-
lant's property that he might enjoy his own, we cannot well see
how the grant by him to another could confer such a right.
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It was not the conveyance to Wright, under whom the appellee
claims, that gave the right; because the conveyance to Doup and
Wright created this easement. The fee simple was in Wright, and
by him passed to the appellee, but they took the title with the ser-
vitude upon it. They could see the building, its mode of construc-
tion, and the fact that the building of the appellant had its joists,
rafters and roof resting on this wall must have been known to all.
It is not a question of title or even notice, as the parties must be
presumed to have knowledge of the real boundary; but the ques-
tion is was the use or continuance of the easement necessary for
the support of the structure. The parties, as said in the case of
Lampman v. Milks, 21 N. Y. 505, are presumed to contract with
reference to the condition of the property at the time of the sale,
and neither has the right, by altering arrangements then openly
existing, to change materially the relative value of the respective
parts. This, the appellant or her vendor, when they purchased this
property, took, with all the benefits and burdens which appeared at
the time of the sale to belong to it. They well knew-all the par-
ties-that the building could not stand with the wall removed, and
the right to remove it by the appellee is based on no other ground
than that he is the owner of the fee. This would apply to all ser-
vitudes, as they cannot exist without the recognition of a dominant
estate. The use of the fee cannot be made so as to destroy the
enjoyment of the easement; and the elementary books say that one
of the recognised modes of creating an easement is where the owner
of an entire estate sells a portion, the purchaser takes his purchase
with the burdens and benefits as they exist, or rather as they ap-
pear. "So if one proprietor erect two adjoining houses with a wall
between them, for the purpose of supporting both buildings, and
the same is necessary for that purpose, and he then conveys with
metes and bounds by a line running through the centre of the wall,
the grant would carry, not only what was within the limits de-
scribed, but pass as an easement appurtenant to the grant a right
of support of the house by the entire wall as well that not included
as that within the limits mentioned in the deed :" Washburne on
Easements, p. 336.
In the case of -Ricards v. Rose, an English case, found in
2 Am. Law Reg. (0. S.) 180, in discussing a question somewhat
analogous as to the rights of purchasers from a common owner, it
is said: "The right of mutual support remains, and the circum-
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stance of the title of the houses having been separated by one act,
at one time, or by different acts at different times, can make no dif-
ference in this respect."
In the case of Bobbins v. Barns, Hob. 131, and cited in the
case of Lampman v. Milks, it was held, "That when one of two
adjoining houses was originally built in such a manner that one
overhung a portion of the other, although the overhanging was
originally wrongful, yet if both houses should come afterwards to
be owned by one person, and he should sell them to different per-
sons, without alteration, the purchaser of the overhanging house
would thereby acquire the right to maintain his house in that con-
dition, and when it decayed to pull it down and build another of
the same description. The houses must be taken as they were at
the time of the conveyance."
The appellant has a right in common with the appellee to the use
and enjoyment of this wall for the support of his house; and it is
unreasonable to say that because the appellee owns the fee, and may
be deprived of such use of his ground as may be necessary for its
improvement, or for his own comfort, that he can tear down and
destroy appellant's building. If he can take away a part of the
flooring and roof, he may demolish the entire building by removing
the wall; hnd this, from the beginning he has made, will likely be
done, unless the chancellor interferes. It is unnecessary to inquire
whether the appellant has a remedy at law, and to determine that
because she could maintain an action of trespass or recover dam-
ages, she must look on and see her house destroyed, for that would
in effect invite the appellee to finish his undertaking. When the
injury is irreparable or permanent ruin to property will ensue from
the wrongful act, a court of equity will interfere by injunction to
prevent the injury: see Hahn & Harris v. Thornberry, 7 Bush
403; .lusselman v. Marquis, 1 Id. 463.
It is said, in the opinion below, that the injury is not irreparable,
because the appellant can build a wall of her own. The injury we
would regard as irreparable when the consequence is the destruction
of the building by reason of the act of the appellee, and that
another wall will have to be erected or house built, is not only con-
clusive as to the extent .of the injury being sustained, but of the
right of the appellant to ask the chancellor for relief. The enjoy-
ment of an easement, says STORY, will be protected or secured by
a court of equity: 2 Story's Eq. Jur. (12 ed.), sect. 927, p. 110.
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It matters not, in a case like this, that the appellee, in the exer-
cise of what he claims to be a right, has committed the wrong before
the injunction was granted, and that he may continue to injure the
building, or, if not, has placed the house of the appellant in such
a condition as to utterly ruin and destroy it, unless, as is claimed,
the appellaut should build up as the appellee tears down. Here the
owner of the estate, upon which the burden rests, undertakes to
remove it, and does remove that which is indispensable to the build-
ing itself. If left exposed to the weather or barely supported by
the remaining joists, complete ruin will be the result. What relief
should the chancellor give in a case like this ? It seems to us a
judgment should be rendered requiring the appellee to repair the
injury by placing the building in the condition it was prior to his
wrongful act, and paying such damages as the appellant has stis-
tained, by being deprived of the use of her building.. To do other-
wise would be to give the appellee a right by reason of his wrong.
He ought not to be allowed to say that because he has destroyed
the easement therefore the damages sustained is the only relief the
appellant is entitled to.
In the case of Morrison v. llarquardt, 24 Iowa 35; s. c. 7 Am.
L. Reg. (N. S.) 306, the owner of the estate owing servitude was
made to restore it, or the party injured allowed to repair or build,
at the expense of the party committing the wrong. So in this case
the party should be made to restore the wall and repair the build-
ing, or the appellant should be permitted to do so at his expense.
In this case the servitude was not only apparent when the lots
were sold, but it was plain to all that the building of the appellant
could not stand without it; and we see nothing in the proof au-
thorizing the conclusion that the act of the appellee was by the
consent of the appellant, and the relief should have been granted
in the manner designated.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.
In Ray v. Sweeney, 14 Bush 1, the tion of the two lots and houses
Court of Appeals of Kentucky had denied described. A recent English author
the English doctrine of implied grant of says: "A right to support for build-
an easement of air and light in an ings, both from the subjacent and adja-
adjoining lot. But in the principal cent soil, and from adjoining buildings,
case the court announces the well- may be acquired by grant, express or
reeognised doctrine with respect to implied. This right arises by implied
the sale of property in the condi- grant, in the absence of express stipula
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tion, in every case where an owner of
adjoining houses, or of house and land,
severs the property by sale, for in every
such case rights to support are granted
by implication, by the vendor and pur-
chaser respectively, for the preservation
of the buildings belonging to each
other:" Goddard's Law of Easement
(Am. ed.) 228. In the case of adjoin-
ing houses, the proposition stated is
supported by both the English and
American cases.
In the case of Richards v. Rose, cited
in the opinion, 2- Am. L. Reg. (0. S.)
178; 9 Exch. 218; POLLOCK, C. B.,
said: "When a number of houses are
built together on a spot of ground, in
such a manner as to require the mutual
support of each other for the purpose of
their common protection and security,
and the owner afterwards parts with the
possession, either one at a time or both
together, and the property is Afterwards
subdivided by mortgage, or demised in
any other way, it seems necessary, as mat-
ter of common sense, that that right of
mutual support remain; and the circum-
stance of the title of the houses having
been separated by one act at one time,
or by different acts at different times,
can make no difference in this respect.
It would be a violation of common sense
to hold that any man, who by any
means comes into the possession of one
of a number of such houses, might say
to the occupier of the neighboring ones,
' You are not entitled to the protection
and support of my house ; I will pull it
down, and allow yours to collapse and
fall into the ruins.' It is impossible not
to come to the conclusion that the law on
this subject must be in accordance with
the common sense of it; and there is a
case where something similar was held
with respect to another sort of easement,
yiz., a right of way. In all such cases
the right of mutual dependence and sup-
port rests'either on a presumed grant
from one of the parties, or a presumed
reservation of the right by the seller of
the property."
In a subsequent case it was an-
nounced that "where two properties are
possessed by the same owner, and there
has been a severance made of part from
the other, anything which vas used, and
was necessary for the comfortable en-
joyment of that part of the property
which was granted, must be considered
to follow from the grant." This was
spoken with reference to a drain extend-
ing from one lot to another : Ewart v.
Cochrane, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 925. Pyer v.
Carter, 1 Hurlst. & N. 916, is a like
S
case.
In New York a case arose where the
owner of adjoining houses, having a
common party wall, conveyed the houses
to different grantees, and made the
centre of the wall the dividing line of
the land conveyed to them respectively;
each grantee acquired, it was held, an
easement of supporting his building by
means of the half of the wall belonging
to his neighbor. The right was held to
exist so long as the wall continued to be
sufficient for the purpose, and the re-
spective buildings remained in a condi-
tion to need and enjoy its support.
When one of the buildings thus sup-
ported becomes dilapidated or un-
safe and unfit for occupation, and the
removal of the front and rear walls of
such building, with the floors and beams,
would occasion the destruction of the
whole wall, the owner of such building
may, upon reasonable notice to the ten-
ant of the adjoining building, lawfully
take down the whole wall; and if he
occupy no unnecessary time in com-
pleting the work, and use proper care
and skill in its execution, he is not re-
sponsible to the tenant of the adjoining
building for damage resulting from its
exposure to the weather, from loss of
business or inability to let the upper lofts.
It was said it seemed that the easement
of such proprietor in the tenement of the
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other ceases with the existence of the
state of things which had created it, and
that there is no right in either, in case
the other refuse to co-operate, to rebuild
the wall and claim contribution: Part-
ridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601, affirming
the same case, as reported in 3 Duer
184. The chief difference in the facts
of this case, and the principal one is,
that in the latter the wall was not in a
decaying condition and not in need of
repairs, while in the New York case it
was, and it was held that it could be
repaired, even though it subjected the
complaining party to an injury: citing
Campbell v. Mlesiier, 4 Johns. Oh. 334,
and Sherred v. Cisco, 4 Sandf. (N. Y)
S. C. 480. If the wall become unfit for
use it is sai~i it may be removed : Rey-
nolds v. Fargo, 43 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 531;
Crawshaw v. Sumner, 56 Mo. 517.
A block of buildings was erected in
Boston in 1808, consisting of a central
building and two wings, with a piazza
in front of the central building, and side
doors in the wings opening on and
swinging over the piazza, the upper
parts of which were used as windows.
The wings were conveyed in 1811 to
different parties, without mentioning the
side doors, and in 1816 the central
buildings were sold to the United States.
It was held that the use of these side
doors and windows passed as appurte-
nances, without any reference to the
length of time during which they had
been used. Consequently their use
could not be interfered with: United
States v. Appleton, 1 Sumner 492.
So in Pennsylvania, where an ovner
of land subject to a mortgage laid it out
in lots, and bailt on two adjoining lots;
on one was an alley which was used by
the other, and the land was sold in dis-
tinct lots under the mortgage decree of
foreclosure, the use of the alley being
apparent; it was held that the first lot
was sold subject to the use of the alley,
although no reference to it was made in
the sheriff's deed. The law of the case
VoL. XXXI.-51
was formulated as follows : " Where a
continuous and apparent servitude is
imposed by an owner on one part of his
land for the benefit of another, a pur-
chaser at private or judicial sale takes it
subject to the servitude :" Cannon v.
Boyd, 73 Penn. St. 179.
The owner of a fifty-foot lot divided
the same into two equal parts by an east
and west line, and built a house on the
north part, and placed the south wall
thereof so that half of it stood on each
lot; and also made an eight-inch pro-
jection on the south side of the wall
resting on the south lot, containing a
flue which was specially adapted and
used for carrying off smoke from a fur-
nace permanently built in the house.
The owner conveyed the north half of
the fifty-foot lot to the centre of the
south wall, with the house, to the com-
plainant, and subsequently sold the
south half of the fifty-foot lot to the
defendant. It was held that the case-
ment being obvious and apparent to any
observer, the purchaser of the south lot
was chargeable with notice, and would
be enjoined from interfering with the
flue: Ingals v. Plamondon, 75 Ill. 118;
s. c. 15 Am. L. Reg. 220. A case
similar to the principal one was: Rogers
v. Sinsheimer, 50 N. Y. 646 ; also E-no
v. Del Vecchio, 4 Duer 53; s. c. 6 Id.
17 ; Webster v. Steven, 5 Id. 553.
But a distinction must be observed in
the case. Thus the owner can have no
easement in or over his adjoining lands:
and when he sells one parcel, the right
to enjoy privileges and conveniences
which he, when owner of both, enjoyed
in the other, does not pass to the pur-
chasers: Stanford v.' Lyon, 22 N. J.
Eq. 33; Fetters v. Hiumphreys, 19 Id.
471 ; Thompson v. W4aterlow, L. R., 6
Eq. 36; Langley v. Hammond, L.
R., 3 Exch. 161. If the owner sells
the adjoining lot without a reservation
of any rights in the same, he loses all
such rights: Denton v. Leddell, 23 N. J.
Eq. 64; Tenant v. Goldian, 2 7,d.
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Raym. 1093; Dodd v. Btrchell. 1 Hurl.
& C. 113.
A cc NT WINDOWS.-There is a line
of interesting cases on the subject of
ancient lights, depending upon the prin-
ciple announced in this case. Thus
one Sexton owned two lots, adjoining
each other, and in 1797 built a house
upon one with windows looking out
upon his adjoining lot. The house was
built on the line dividing the two lots.
His heirs in 1829 sold the lot with the
house on it to one Smith, who after-
wards sold the same to Robeson and
Maxwell. The heirs of Sexton sold the
other lot in 1831 to one Iatthews; and
he conveyed it to Pittenger. In 1838
Pittenger attempted to build a house on
his lot so as to shut up the windows of
the house on the adjoining lot. The
court enjoined the erection of the build-
ing, upon the ground that the owner of
the old house had an easement in the
light which flowed across Pittenger's lot
of which he could not be deprived ; and
while the court recognised the well-
known English law of ancient lights
with regard to the adverse user, yet it
placed its decision upon the circum-
stauce of the purchase from the joint
owner of the two lots, and the fact that
each successive owner of the adjoining
lot took it with notice of the plaintiff's
rights : Robeson v. Pittenger, 1 Green
(N. J.) Eq. 57. It is to be observed
that the court afterwards decided, that
where one builds a house on the boun-
dary line of his lot, he cannot acquire a
right to light by adverse user, and the
adjoifiing owner cannot be prevented
from obstructing the windows of the
former: King v. Miller, 4 Halst. 559.
It is very doubtful if the courts of New
Jersey would follow Robeson v. Pitten-
get, supra, at this date upon the same
state of facts. See Hayden v. Dutcher,
31 N. J. Eq. 217.
So in England, at an early day, it was
said: " If I have a house with certain
lights in it, and lands adjoining, and I
sell the house but keep the land adjoining,
neither I, nor any one claiming under
me, can obstruct the lights by building
on the land I retained, for, by selling
the house I sell an easement in the lights
also :" Palmer v. Fletcher. 1 Lev. 122
(1675) ; see Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. I
Lamrpman v. .Mfilks, 21 N. Y. 505;
Nichols v. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121
Robbins Y. Barnes, Hob. 131. This
doctrine was well illustrated in Havens,
v. Klein, 51 How. Pr. 82, where win-
dow shutters swung out over an adjoin-
ing lot owned by the proprietor of the
house, which house he afterwards sold.
A like case is Story v. Odin, 12 Mass.
157; and the principle announced in
Robeson v. Pittenger, supra, has been
recognised in a number of authorities.
See Grant v. Chase, 17 Mass. 443;
Thayer v. Payne, 2 Cush. 327; Cox v.
M1,atthews, Vent. 237 ; Riviere v. Bower,
Ry. & Mo. 24; Lasala v. Holbrook, 4
Paige (Ch.) 169 ; Sw'ansborough v. Cot-
entry, 9 Bing. 305. See Tenant v.
Goodwin, 2 Ld. Raym. 1093; White v.
Bass, 7 Hurl. & Nor. 722 ; Hubbard v.
Town, 33 Vt. 295. Rosewell v. Pryor,
in different phases, was three times be-
fore the court: 6 Mod. 116; s. a. 12
Id. 215, 635. Lord HoLT, said: "If
a man have a vacant piece of ground,
and builds thereupon, and that house
has very good lights, and he lets this
house to another, and afterwards builds
upon a contiguous piece of ground, or
lets the contiguous piece of ground to
another, who builds thereupon, to the
nuisance of the lights in the first house,
the lessee of the first house shall have an
action upon the case against such build-
ers, for the first house was granted to
him with all the easements and de-
lights then belonging to it." See
Durel v. Boisblanc, 1 La. Ann. 407. -
So, in Maryland, the English doctrine
as to light is upheld where the owner of
two adjoining lots conveyed one of them:
Janes v. Jenkins, 34 Md. 1 ; s. c. 11
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Am. L. Reg. 24. The English doctrine
of presumptive title to light and air re-
ceived over land of another person,
arising from uninterrupted user for
twenty years and upwards, has been
acknowledged and declared to be the
law in Delaware in all its breadth:
Clawson v. Pdmrose, 15 Am. L. fReg.
6. The note appended in the Register
contains a citation of all the English and
American cases upon this subject.
Those who desire to pursue the sub-
ject further, will find in the following
citations the doctrine of the principal
case applied to right of light and air:
Allen v. Taylor, 16 Ch. Div. 355 ; 50
L. J. Ch. 178-L R. ; Barnes v.
Loac,, L. R., 4 Q. B. Div. 494; 48 ,.
J. Q. B. 756 ; Warner v. MloBryde, 36
L. T. (N. 8.) 360.
But the doctrine of implied grant with
respect to light and air coming across
the adjacent property of the vendor, has
been denied by a number of courts:
Myers v. Gemmel, 10 Barb. 537 ; Tur-
ner v. Thompson, 58 Geo. 269 ; Palmer
v. Wemore, 2 Sandf. Sup. Ct. 316;
Morrison v. Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35 ; s.
o. 7 Am. L. Reg. 336; Keats v. Hugo,
115 Mass. 204.
The cases of Mullen v. Stricker, 19
Ohio St. 135; Maynard v. .Esher, 17
Penn. St. 222; Collier v. Pierce, 7
Gray 18, and Randall v. Sanderson, 111
lMass. 114, adopt the same view. But
it is necessary to note that in these four
cases both the adjoining lots in each case
were sold at the same instant--generally
at auction-and that the sale at the
same time of both lots, had much
weight given it by the courts in deciding
the rights of the parties.
Other cases hold that an implied grant
of an easement in light will be sustained
only in cases of real necessity; and will
be denied or rejected in cases where it
appears that the owners claiming the
easement can, at a reasonable cost, have
or substitute other lights to his building:
Turner v. Thompson, 58 Geo. 268;
Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1; s. 0. 13
Am. Rep. 629. And in a recent En-
glish case this view was adopted. A
vendor having conveyed a pl6t of land-
part of his property-to A., without any
reservation, and subsequently another
plot, part of the property retained and
adjoining the first plot to B., upon B.
claiming in right of his plot, a right of
light over A.'s plot, which, in the opin-
ion of the court, was not an easement of
necessity, it was held that, though the
easement claimed might be continuous
and apparent, yet, not being of necessity,
there was no implied reservation of it by
the vendor out of his conveyance to A.,
and B. was, therefore, not entitled to
it: Wheeldon v. Burrows, 18 Am. L.
Reg. 646; s. c. 12 Ch. Div. 31; 48
L. J. Oh. 853; 41 L.T. 327; 28W.
Rep. 196. The same reasoning was*
applied to a drain in Randall v. Me-
Louqlin, 10 Allen 366; Dolljif v.
Boston and Maine Railroad Co., 68 Me.
173.
MUANDATOIY INJUNCTIONS.-Another
important part of the decision in the
principal case is the granting of a man-
datory injunction to restore the property
to its original condition. "While the
jurisdiction of equity by way of manda-
tory injunction is rarely exercised, and
while its existence has even been ques-
tioned, it is nevertheless too firmly es-
tablished to admit of doubt:" High on
Injunction (2d ed.), sect. 2. It has been
defined as follows: "A mandatory in-
junction is such as, being framed in an
indirect form, compels the defendant to
restore things to their former condition,
and virtually directs the defendant to
perform an act:" Joyce on Injunc-
tion 1310.
The grounds for equitable interposi-
tion by mandatory injunction are two-
fold: First, the inadequacy of any legal
remedy to secure the party in the enjoy-
ment of his rights ; and second, to pre-
vent a multiplicity of suits; as to con-
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pel the restoration of running water to
its natural channel, when wrongfully
diverted therefrom, at the suit of the
party whose lands include either the
whole or a part of such channel: Cor-
ning v. Troy Iron and .Iail Factory, 40
N. Y. 191 ; s. a. 34 Barb. 485 ; 39 Id.
311 ; Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. 193 ;
Longwood Valley Railroad Co. v. Baker,
12 C. E. Green (N. J.) Eq. 166.
The rule is that an interlocutory order
need not be applied for where the in-
junction sought is mandatory: Gale v.
Abbot, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 987.
Yet mandatory injunctions are al-
lowed on interlocutory application; and
the practice is followed where great and
irreparable injury would result before
final hearing: Robinson v. Byron, 1
Bro. C. C. 588. As to compel the re-
moval of tiles placed on the tops of chim-
neys which can be taken off: Hervey v.
Smith, 1 Kay & J. 392. Or to pull
down a building that was clearly a nui-
sance: 3 Dan. Chan. Prac. 1767 ; by
restraining the owner from permitting it
to remain: Rankin v. Huskisson, 4 Sim.
13. So on final hearing: North of Eng-
land Railtbay Co. v. Clarence Railway
Co., 1 Coll. 507.
And on final hearing the defendant in
another case was compelled to remove a
plate put over the fine of a chimney so
as to fill the house with smoke: The At-
torney-General v. Ietropolitan Board, I
Hem. & Mil. 321. And to compel the
removal of combustible jute which en-
dangered the plaintiff's premises: R1ep-
burn v. Lardner, 2 Hem. & JAlil. 345. So
an injunction was ordered to restrain per-
mitting the communication complained of
(by which complainant's mine was
flooded), to remain bpen. The injunc-
tion was to prevent the flowing of a mine
by restraining or removing the means by
which the defendant continued to do it :
Mexborough v. Bower, 7 Beav. 127. So
an injunction against preventing the plain-
tiffs from having access to the books of
the firm, and keeping them at any other
place than the place of business of the
partnership: Greatrex v. Greatrex, 1
De Gex & Sm. 692; or excluding him
from exercising his right as a partner:
Marble Conpany v. Ripley, 10 Wall.
339.
So, where a court of equity decreed a
conveyance from the defendant to the
complainant, and the defendant refused
to deliver up the premises and execute
a deed therefor, a writ of injunction to
compel a delivery of the possession was
issued: Garretson v. Cole, 1 Har. & J.
370.
So, to quiet title as against an out-
standing deed, and cause it to be de-
livered up. But a decree commanding
the delivery of the deed will not be
granted where the deed appears void on
its face: Peirsoll v. Elliott, 6 Pet. 95.
So, to restrain the defendant from per-
mitting an obstruction to remain on the
plaintiff's roof: Martyr v. Lawrence, 2
De Gex J. & S. 261. So, to restrain
the defendant from permitting a build-
ing erected by him to remain in the
plaintiff's right of way: Krehl v. Bur-
rell, 7 Ch. Div. 551.
So, to compel the closing of a ditch
unlawfully opened, by which the plain-
tiff's lands were being flooded: Foot v.
Bronson, 4 Lansing 47.
So, to command not thereafter to con-
tinue to cause to flow irregularly a
stream by which the plaintiff's mill had
been supplied, and the current of which
had been impeded by breaches made by
the defendant: Murdock's (aset Bland.
(Mfd.) Ch. 471 ; s. c. 20 Am. Cas. 381),
and note.
So, where the defendant had cove-
nanted with his vendor to erect a pump
and reservoir at a well or spring, which
covenant ran with the fee, it was held,
though it was not one of which the
court would decree specific performance
directly, as being for the construction of
works which the court could not super-
intend, yet it could be enforced indi-
rectly by an injunction restraining the
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defendant from allowing the work to
remain unperformed : Cooke v. Chilcott,
3 Ch. Div. 694.
So, where the defendant had agreed to
make a road, a mandatory injunction
issued to prevent him from allowing the
work to remain unperformed : Storer v.
Great Western Railway Co., 2 Younge &
Coll. Ch. 48.
But one was refused to compel a land-
lord to repair the demised premises
where he had covenanted to do so : Jarvis
v. Henwood, 10 C. E. Green (N. J.)
460.
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co.,
13 How. 518, was a petition for an
injunction to prevent the company from
obstructing the navigation of the Ohio
river by its bridge. The bridge was
nearly completed, and was as much an
obstruction as it would be when com-
pleted. The court issued an order com-
pelling the company to change its bridge
according to certain given specifications,
and that it do it by a certain date.
A statute provided that an injunction
might be granted against the malicious
erection upon one's own land of any
structure intended to annoy or injure
any proprietor of adjacent land, in re-
spect to his use of the same. Where a
structure was thus stealthily erected, and
was completed before an application for
an injunction could be made, the court
granted an injunction against its con-
tinuance: Harbison v. White, 46 Conn.
106. So, where a building was erected
in violation of a contract with com-
plainant and defendant's original gran-
tor of both their lots, to the effect that
no wooden buildings should be erected
on either of their two lots, and the de-
fendant succeeded in getting up a
wooden building before a restraining
order could be obtained: Gaslin v.
Balls, 13 Ch. Div. 324 ; Rankin v. Bus-
isson, 4 Sim. 13.
And where an action was brought in
the name of a church corporation, al.
leging that the defendants had taken
possession of its church building, and
part of its official records, and were
threatening to seize the remainder of the
records and all its temporalities, it was
held that by an injunction restraining the
defendants from further interfering with
the property and temporalities of the
corporation, the plaintiff, by its trustees,
officers and members, could be restored
to the peaceful possession of its rights,
without any further order of court,
except a special order requiring the
defendants to restore that portion of the
records of the corporation which they
had taken: Lutheran Ev. Church v.
Gristgau, 34 Wis. 328. See Baptist
Congregation v. Scannel, 3 Grant (Pa.)
48.
Where the defendants, by means of a
tunnel run into a mountain at a lower
altitude than complainant's tunnel,
wrongfully intercepted water" appro-
priated by complainant, flowing in its
said tunnel, and diverted it therefrom, a
preliminary injunction was granted, re-
straining the continuance of said diver-
sion, although obedience to the injunc-
tion rendered it necessary for the
defendants to build a bulkhead or dam
across the tunnel: C. S. M. Co. v. V.
6- G. H. TV. Co., 1 Sawyer 470; s. c.
Id. 685.
A mandatory injunction will be issued
where the flow of water, necessary to
run a large factory, has been cut off;
especially so where the amount of loss
of profits would be difficult or impossible
to estimate: Isenberg v. East India
House Estate, 33 L. J. Eq. 392.
So, health officers may be restrained by
a mandatory injunction from allowing a
sewer to remain open : 11anchester Rail-
road Co. v. Worksop Board bf Bealth,
23 Beav. 209 ; Pierce v. New Orleans,
18 La. Ann. 242.
The manager of a business has been
enjoined from excluding the owner of
the business.from the premises : Eachus
v. Moss, 14 W. R. 327.
Where the lessee of a mine had
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worked into the complainant's premises, level, they were restrained from making
and extracted a large amount of ore a road at a lower level than they
therefrom, a mandatory injunction was had agreed to do: Foster v. Birning-
granted requiring defendant to permit han, 6-c., Railway Co., 2 W. R. 378.
the complainant to inspect the mine for A court may compel the alteration of
the purpose of determining the extent the elevation or form of a building so as
of the injury: Thomas Iron Co. v. Al- to be in conformity with the terms of a
lentown Alining Co., 28 N. J. Eq. 77. contract or an act of the legislature:
In case of the obstruction of ancient Warden of Dover Harbor v. South-
lights a mandatory injunction has been eastern Railway Co., 9 Hare 493;
allowed to restore them to their pre- Franklyn v. Tuton, 5 Madd. 46.
vious condition: Kf elk v. Pearson, L. In Webb v. Portland 3anufacturing
R., 6 Ch. 809. Even before final hear- Co., 3 Sumn. 189, a mandatory injunc-
ing: Bladel v. Rengy, L. R., 3 Eq. 465. tion was issued to prevent tile diversion
But delay may waive the right to this of a stream to the injury of the plaintiff's
extraordinary remedy: Senior v. Paw- mill, where the defendant had already
son, L. R., 3 Eq. 330. done the act which caused the diver-
Where the defendant had entered into sion.
a covenant restraining the erection of In Goodson v. Richardson, L. R., 9
buildings upon the premises conveyed Ch. Ap. 221, an injunction was granted
to him, a mandatory injunction was against permitting water pipes to re-
issued to compel their removal when main which the defendant had laid in
erected in violation of such covenant, the plaintiff's soil.
and where the grantor had suffered Where a plaintiff has proven his right
actual damage: Lord Manners v. John- to an injunction against a nuitance or
son, I Oh. Div. 673; Schwoerer v. Boyl- other injury, it is no part of the duty of
ston, 99 Alass. 285. the court to inquire in what way the
So, where a husband wrongfully seized defendant can best remove it. The
possession of his wife's separate estate plaintiff is entitled to an injunction at
and excluded her, a mandatory injunc- once, unless the removal of the injury is
tion was issued to restore the possession "physically impossible ; and it is the duty
to her: Green v. Green, 5 Hare 400 n. of the defendant to find his own way out
No doubt if a public highway was of the difficulty, whatever inconvenience
closed up a mandatory injunction would or expense it may put him to: Attorney-
issue to compel its opening : Stevens v. General v. Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum,
Paterson and Newark Railroad Co., 20 L. H., 4 Ch. Ap. 146.
N. J. Eq. 126; McDonogh v. Callo- An injunction was refused to compel
way, 7 Robinson 442; Newmorch v. a common carrier to transport goods at
Brondling, 3 Swanston 99. the rates fixed by law: Rogers Locomo-
In Pennsylvania a mandatory injunc- tive and Machine Works v. Erie Railway
tion lies at the suit 'of the attorney- Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 379.
general, to compel the Lehigh Coal and So, a mandatory injunction was re-
Navigatioii Company to restrain the fused where it was sought by dealers
company from neglecting to repair its and shippers of coal to compel a railroad
canal, dams, locks and other devices for company to allow or continue to the
navigation : Buck. Mountain Coal Co. v. plaintiffs such use of wharves and wharf-
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 50 ing privileges for shipping coal as were
Penn. St. 91. required for their business: Audenried v.
Where a railway company had agreed Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Co.,
with a man to make a road at a certain 68 Penn. St. 370. Such an injunction
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will not be allowed to compel the re-
building of a wall which had been over-
thrown, the remedy being ample at law:
Doran v. Carroll, 11 Ir. Ch. 379. So
where the title to the locus in quo is in
dispute, one will not be issued to put the
complainant in possession: Gaunt v.
Fynney, L. R., 8 Ch. 8.
In Lexhkqton City National Bank v.
Gnysn, 6 Bush 486, a mandatory in-
junction was refused on ie ground that
the wrong done, if any, was complete,
and that the remedy was at law. It
was sought to compel the removal of a
building erected across a certain passage-
way. But the court in fact refused the
injunction because it was of the opinion
that there was no obstruction of the ease-
ment upon which the building was al-
leged to have been built.
In Risher v. Board of Trade, 80 Il.
85, a mandatory injunction to compel
the restoration of the plaintiff to member-
ship in an association from which lie had
been unlawfully expelled was refused.
So, where a party entered by force
upon the premises of another, in his ab-
sence, a mandatory injunction to compel
him to yield up possession to the rightful
owner, was refused, upon the ground
that the damage was already done:
Wangelin v. Goe, 50 Ill. 459.
So, where the damages resulting from
the stoppagq of ancient lights was small,
a mandatory injunction to open them
was refused: Webster v. Wiewall, 42
L. T. 868.
One of the leading authorities upon
injunction says: "Though a court of
equity has no jurisdiction to compel the
performance of a positive act tending to
alter the existing state of things, such as
the removal of a work already executed,
it may, by framing the order in an indi-
rect form, compel a defendant to restore
things to their former condition, and so
effectuate the same results as would be
obtained by ordering a positive act to be
done. The order when framed in such
a~orm is called a mandatory injunction.
The jurisdiction has been questioned,
but its existence must be admitted as
beyond all doubt. It must, however,
be exercised with caution, and is strictly
confined to cases where the remedy at
law is inadequate for the purpose of
justice, and the restoring of things to
their former condition is the only remedy
which will meet the requirements of the
case. If there is a full and complete
remedy at law, or if the injury done can
be sufficiently estimated and properly
compensated by a pecuniary sum, there
is no case for a mandatory injunction.
The court will not interfere by way of
mandatory injunction without taking
into consideration the comparative con-
venience and inconvenience which the
granting or withholding the injunction
would cause to the parties. If the in-
jury done is capable of being fully and
abundantly compensated by a pecuniary
sum, while the inconvenience to the
other party from granting an injunction
would be serious, the court will not inter-
fere by way of mandatory injunction,
but will either direct an inquiry before
itself in order to ascertain the measure
of damages that has been actually sus-
tained, or will, on dismissing the bill,
reserve to the plaintiff his right to pro-
ceed at law. If on the other hand the
injury is of so serious or material a
character that the restoring things to
their former condition is the only remedy
which will meet the requirements of the
case, or if the act complained of is in
breach of an express stipulation, the in-
junction will issue, notwithstanding the
amount of inconvenience to the other
party., If the act complained of is con-
tinued or carried on after clear and dis-
tinct notice that it is objected to, the
jurisdiction will be exercised more
freely than in cases where the complaint
is not made until after it is completed ;
but the mere fact that the act complained
of has been continued or carried on after
notice of objection, is not of itself a
sufficient ground for the exercise of the
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jurisdiction, if the injury done can be
amply, abundantly and properly com-
pensated by a pecuniary sum. There is
no rule which prevents the court from
granting a mandatory injunction where
the injury sought to be restrained has
been completed before the filing of the
bill. A man who comes to the court for
a mandatory injunction should use due
diligence in making the application.
Mere delay will not be fatal to the ap-
plication if no mischiefis caused thereby
to the defendant, and the delay does not
exceed a reasonable period; but the
right to a mandatory injunction is gone
if there has been unreasonable delay,
and mischief would be caused thereby to
the defendant. A bill for a mandatory
injunction should pray for a preventive
remedy. There can be no case for pre-
'vention where what is asked to be pre-
vented has been actually done :" Kerr
on Injunction, pp. 230, 231, 232.
It is undoubtedly the case, as the list
of authorities cited in this note shows,
that mandatory injunctions are more
freely and frequently granted in Eng-
land than in the United States. Bu
the writ is not always denied in this
country. The citation of authorities
abundantly demonstrates the power of
courts of equity, or those with equity ju-
risdiction, to issue such writs whenever
there is an equity in favor of it. It will
be observed that the writ was issued in
those cases where a continuance of the
injury complained of would work a
further injury. Where the injury was
already done, and no further injury
could be done, there the writ is very
properly denied, because its issuance is
not necessary for the preservation of the
complainant's rights or property. A
few examples will illustrate this. A
court of equity will always intervene
with its strong arm in case of a threat-
ened danger, and it has the power to
prevent it by restraining the parties
putting, or threatening to put, it in
motion. Suppose a company was sup-
plying a city with water by pipes laid
under its streets, and the city was de-
pendent upon such supply of water to
put out fires. If the supply was unlaw-
fully cut off, a court of equity would
have full power to issue a writ of in-
junction to compel the company to cease
preventing the water from flowing, even
though it required the keeping up of
fires under boilers for that purpose. In
such a case a mandatory injunction
would undoubtedly issue at once, with-
out waiting for a final decree; especially
so if it occurred at a very dry time, when
fires would be likely to do great damage.
So, where a gas company wantonly cut
off the supply of gas from a large city in
violation of a contract, leaving the city
in darkness. Or where a public and
much used thoroughfare, in a populous
county or city, is obstructed, or a water-
course whereon boats run, a mandatory
injunction would issue at once to restore
it to its former condition, and not wait
until the final decree, or until the de-
fendant was indicted and convicted of
obstructing a public highway. An in-
structive case upon granting a temporary
mandatory injunction, is that of The Cole
Silver M11ining Co. v. The Virginia and
Gold Hill Water Co., 1 Sawyer 470.
This case has already been cited in this
note. The first opinion was delivered
by Judge SwYER. He granted a pre-
liminary mandatory injunction. Mr.
Justice FsELn concurred in the action
of Judge SAwYER upon final hearing (Id.
685), saying: "The owner of flumes, ac-
queducts or reservoirs of water might,
for instance, flood his neighbor's fields
by raising the sluice gates to these
structnres, and, if the flowing should
not be speedily stayed, might destroy
the latter's crops ; and yet, according to
the argument of the learned counsel, no
injunction could issue to restrain the
owner from continuing the flood, if obedi-
ence should require him to do the simple
affirmative act of closing his gates. The
person whose fields were inundated and
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whose crops were destroyed, in the case
supposed, would find poor satisfaction in
being told that he must wait until final
decree before any process could issue to
compel the shutting of the gates, and hie
must seek compensation for the injuries
his property may suffer in the meantime,
in an action at law."
Again: "Other cases to the same
purport might be cited, but these are
sufficient, I think, to show that a court
of equity has jurisdiction to issue, upon
an interlocutory application, an injunc-
tion which will operate to compel the
defendant, in order to obey it, to do sub-
stantive acts. It is a jurisdiction which
should only be exercised in a case where
irreparable injury would follow from a
:eglcct to do the act required. Some
of the adjudged cases evince a disposi-
tion on the part of the court to restrict
rather than enlarge this jurisdiction:
( 3lakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal
Co., I Myl. & K. 154). Undoubtedly,
the general purpose of a temporary in-
junction is to preserve the property in
controversy from waste or destruction or
disturbance, until the rights and equities
of the contesting ptrties can be fully
considered and determined. Usually
this can be effected by restraining any
interference with it ; but in some cases
the continuance of the injury, the corn-
mencement of which has induced the
invocation of the authority of a court of
equity, would lead to the waste and de-
struction of the property. It is just
here where the special jurisdiction of the
court is needed to restore the property
to that condition in which it existed im-
mediately preceding the commencement
of the injury, so that it may be preserved
until final decree :" Id., p. 693. See
also the restraining orders granted in
Southern Express Co. v. Nashville, C. .
St. L. Railway, 20 Am. Law. Reg. N.
S. 590, and cases cited in note.,
On tie contrary, in the case of Auden-
tied v. Pdladelphia, 4-c., Railroad Co.,
68 Penn. St. 370, and Rogers Locomzo-
tive and fflachne Works v. Erie Railway
Co., 5 C. E. Green (N. J.) 387, strong
grounds were taken against the granting
of mandatory injunctions upon prelimi-
nary hearing, and the power of courts in
such cases practically denied.
Those instances in which a mandatory
injunction has been granted, in many
cases upon final bearing, resemble very
closely the enforcement of the decree of
a court of equity by a writ of execution
or the like. Where such a writ is issued
to compel performance of a contract or
covenant, it very closely resembles a
decree for specific performance.
W. W. TuontTOW.
Indianapolis.
United States Circuit Court, District of Oregon.
SPARE v. HOME MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
A contract for insurance against loss by fire is a contract of indemnity ; and a
contraeftto that end with a person who has no insurable interest in the property, or who
cannot sustain any pecuniary loss by injury thereto, is a mere wager, contrary to
public policy and void.
Any person who has a legal or equitable interest in property, or is so related
to it that an injury to it may cause him pecuniary loss, has an insurable interest
therein.
A judgment creditor has an insurable interest in the properly of his debtor; but
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he cannot recover from the insurer upon an injury thereto as for a loss to himself,
unless he also shows that the judgment debtor has not sufficient property left, out
of which the judgment can be satisfied.
While the insurer may be estopped to insist on conditions and restrictions con-
tained in a policy issued with a knowledge of facts inconsistent therewith, neither
party to a contract of insurance which is void as being contrary to public policy, is
estopped to deny its legality.
THE plaintiff, a citizen of Oregon, brought this action against
the defendant, a corporation formed under the laws of California
and doing business in Oregon, to recover the sum of $900, with
interest since March 1st 1882, on a policy of insurance for that
amount, against loss by fire.
The case was heard upon a demurrer to the complaint. The
question argued was, had the plaintiff an insurable interest in the
property destroyed? The facts are fully stated in the opinion.
W. Scott Beebe, for the plaintiff.
Cyrus Dolph, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DEAfY, J.-From the amended complaint it appears that on
July 26th 1881, Aaron and Ben Lurch were partners under the
name of "Lurch Brothers," and -as such, owned a lot in Cottage
Grove, Lane county, Oregon, of the value of $100, together with
a warehouse thereon of the value of $1300; that on December 1st
1878, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against said firm, in the
Circuit Court of the state for said county, for the sum of $4500,
which judgment was duly docketed before said July 26th, and
thereafter was a lien thereon ; that on said last-mentioned date
the defendant, in consideration of the premium of $18.90, paid to
it by plaintiff, insured him against loss or damage by fire to said
warehouse, for one year, in the sum of $900, and that on Feb-
ruary 14th 1882, said warehouse was totally destroyed by fire,
whereby the plaintiff was damaged $1300.
The complaint also states that on March 1st 1882, the proof of
loss was furnished and the same adjusted at $900, and that the
defendant at all the times mentioned well knew that the property
was owned by "Lurch Brothers," and the nature of, the plaintiff's
interest therein.
A contract for insurance against fire with a person not having
an insurable interest in the property, or subject of the insurance,
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is a mere wager, and considered void on grounds of public policy.
For where the only interest that th6 assured has in the property is
its destruction by fire, the transaction is a direct incentive to fraud
and arson.
A lawful contract of insurance against fire is, therefore, a con-
tract of indemnity--an engagement to make good to the assured a
pecuniary loss sustained by him on account of injury to the pro-
perty in question. Therefore it is said that the assured must have
an interest in the property injured, for otherwise he can suffer n6
loss thereby: Woods Fire Ins., sect. 248; Bohrbach v. Germania
-Fire Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 52; Grevemeyer v. Southern Hut.
Fire Ins. Co., 62 Penn. St. 340; iHicDonald v. Admr. of Black,
20 Ohio 191 ; Carter v. Humboldt -Fire Ins. Co., 12 Iowa 287;
Godin v. London Assurance Co., 1 Burr. 489; Haneox v. Fish-
ing Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. 134.
But what is such an interest in the property is not altogether
clear upon the authorities.
In Hancox v. -fishing Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. 140, Mr. Justice
STORY says, "that an insurable interest is sui generis, and pecu-
liar in its texture and operation ;" and that, "it sometimes exists
where there is not any present property, or jus in re or Jus ad
rem." In Rohrbaeh v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 54,
FOLGER, J., said, this interest need not amount to a legal or
equitable title to the property, but that "if there be a right in or
against the property, which some court will enforce upon the pro-
perty, a right so closely connected with it, and so much dependent
for value upon the continued existence of it alone, as that a loss
of the property will cause pecuniary damage to the holder of the
right against it, he has an insurable interest."
Accordingly, it has been held that a person having a specific lien
upon property as a security for a debt, such as a mechanic or mort-
gagee, has an insurable interest therein, and that although he may
also have the personal obligation of his debtor for the payment of
the same: Carter v. Humboldt Fire Ins. Co., supra. And in
Herkimer v'. Bice, 27 N. Y. 163, it was held that the creditors of
an insolvent estate had an insurable interest therein, upon the
-ground that the same was pledged by the law to the payment of
the debts of the deceased. See also comments on Chief Justice
DENIO'S opinion in this case, by FOLGER, J., in Bohrbach v. Ger-
mania Tire Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 57.
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But no case has been found in which it was held that a judgment
creditor, by reason simply of his lien on the judgment debtor's pro-
perty, has an insurable interest therein. In Grevemeyer v. S. Mut.
Fire 1ns. Co., supra, it was distinctly held that he had not. The
decision is placed on the ground that "a judgment is a general and
not a specific lien. If there be personal property of the debtor,
it is to be satisfied out of that. If there be not, then it is a lien on
all his real estate without discrimination, and hence the plaintiff is
iiot interested in the property as property, but only in the lien."
It does not appear from the report of the case whether the d6btor
had other property out of which the judgment might have been
satisfied or not.
In considering this question it ought not to be overlooked that
insurance against loss, to the party insured, by fire, is a transaction
intended and calculated to preserve and promote the financial se-
curity and stability of the community, and therefore ought to be
regarded with favor and upheld by the courts. On the other hand,
a wagering policy, by which the assured is to receive the insurance
upon the destruction of the property, although he lost nothing
thereby, the courts will not enforce.
But in my judgment, whoever is in danger of loss by fire ought
to be allowed to insure against it. Whenever it appears that the
assured has a pecuniary interest in the preservation of the subject-
matter of the insurance against injury by fire, he has such an inter-
est therein, or holds such a relation thereto, as gives him a right to
protect himself by insurance.
A judgment creditor, in Oregon, upon the docketing of his
judgment, has a lien upon all the real property of the judgment
debtor within the county, as a security for his debt: Oregon Code,
C. P. sect. 266. But such lien cannot be enforced, if sufficient
personal property can be found to satisfy the judgment : Id., sect.
273.
Under these circumstances if it appears that the debtor has no
personal property and that his real property, with the combustible
improvements thereon, is not more than sufficient to satisfy the
judgment, I think the creditor ought to be regarded as having an
insurable interest. Although he has no legal or equitable title to,
or interest in the property, he certainly sustains such a relation
thereto that any injury to it would cause a corresponding loss to
him; and nothing more than this can be said of the right of a mort-
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gagee, mechanic or even the legal owner to insure. In the corpus
of the property insured he may have no interest or estate, but he
has a pecuniary interest in its preservation and may sustain a loss
by its destruction: Springfield P. & Hl. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 43 N.
Y. 389.
But when the judgment debtor has personal property out of
which the judgment can be made, or when the real property upon
which it is a lien is clearly more than sufficient for that purpose, is
the judgment creditor thereby precluded from protecting himself
by insurance against possible loss from injury to his security by
fire ? This is a question upon which no direct decision has been
produced. But upon general principles I think the creditor has an
insurable interest; that is, he sustains such a relation to the subject
as gives him an interest in its preservation against fire. The law
gives the judgment creditor a lien on his debtor's real property as
a security for his debt, and whatever may be its value as compared
with the amount of the debt, if this value is chiefly or even partly
owing to the buildings thereon, and is therefore liable to be depre-
ciated by fire, the creditor sustains such a relation to the property
that he may insure against loss by this injury to his security. And
the fact that the debtor has more orless personal property at the time
is immaterial. When the creditor concludes to enforce his judgment
this personal property may have been destroye.d or disposed of.
And so, if the real property to which the lien extends, and upon
which the insurance is effected, is then of much greater value than
the debt, it may be of much less value before the creditor levies his
execution upon it. And if, in the meantime, it should be injured
by fire, he would sustain a loss which he ought to be allowed to
protect himself against by insurance.
But, nevertheless, the lien of a judgment creditor is a general
and not a specific one. And, although, as we have seen, circum-
stances may, in particular cases, make it the same in effect as a spe-
cific lien, these are not to be presumed, but must be shown.
The contract for insurance being one for indemnity only, it follows
that. while the judgment creditor may insure himself against loss
by injury from fire to the whole or any part of his security-the
property upon which his judgment is a lien-yet before he can
recover on such contract as for a loss sustained by the peril insured
against, it must appear that at the time of the fire the amount
of the judgment could not have otherwise been made on an execu-
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tion against the property of the judgment debtor. If, notwithstand-
ing the injury to the debtor's property by fire, he has sufficient left,
out of which the judgment may be made, the creditor has sustained
no loss, and can recover nothing from the insurer. His contract
was against loss to himself by fire, not his debtor.
Now the complaint in this case is silent upon this point. True,
it is alleged that the plaintiff sustained a loss by the burning of the
warehouse. But as that conclusion does not necessarily follow from
the premises, the allegation is not sufficient. The complaint should
contain a statement of the facts showing the plaintiff's right to
recover. And as his lien was pima facie a general one, on all the
judgment debtor's real property, and not a specific one on this
warehouse only, and was in effect conditioned on the debtor's want
of personal property to satisfy the judgment, the complaint ought
to show how the plaintiff sustained a loss by this fire-as that the
warehouse was all the property of the judgment debtor subject to
execution, or that what was left would not more than satisfy the
remainder of the judgment.
The plaintiff also contends that the defendant, being well aware
of the nature of his interest in the property at the time he effected
the insurance thereon, is now estopped to say that he had not an
insurable interest therein.
Conditions and.restrictions contained in a policy may be con-
sidered waived by a knowledge, on the part of t&e insurer, of facts
inconsistent therewith. In such case the insurer may be estopped
to insist on the condition, as that no other insurance existed on the
property. Wood on Fire Insurance, sect. 498.
But a contract of insurance entered into contrary to law or pub-
lic policy is simply void, and neither party to it is estopped from
showing the fact. " Otherwise the public law and policy would be
at the mercy of individual interest and caprice." -fn re Comstock,
3 Saw. 228. If the plaintiff sustained no such relation to this
property as entitled him to have it insured against injury by fire,
his contract with the defendant to that effect was a mere wagering
policy, and void, as being contrary to public policy.
But in my judgment the plaintiff was entitled to insure the
property-he had a pecuniary interest in its preservation and might
protect himself against possible loss by its destruction. His was
not a wagering policy, as his right to the insurance was not condi-
tional, not simply on the destruction of the property, but also his
loss thereby.
